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CHAPTER I
FRANCIS MARION AND HIS DISTRICT
The Revolutionary War career of Francis Marion began
on June 17, 1775.

This date marked his election as a

Captain in the Second South Carolina Regiment by the
Provisional Congress of South Carolina.

The regimental

c ommander was Colone l William Moultrie, under whom Marion
had served as a Lieutenant in the Indian Wars of South
Carolina in 1761. 1

On November 14, 1775 Marion was

promoted to Major as a result of the formation of a third
regiment in South Carolina . 2

Marion served with the Second

South Carolina Regime nt during its successful defense of
Charleston against the British on June 28, 1776 . 3

After

1 Edward McGrady, History of South Carolina in the
Revolution (New York: :l\Iacl\Iil lan, 1901), p. 568; Wil liam
Gilmore Simms, The Life of Francis Marion (New York:
Derby , 1858), p . 46; and William Moultrie, Memoirs of the
American Revolution (New York: David Longworth , 1802),
Vol. II, p. 223. Marion had also s erved in the Indian Wars
of 1759 as a Private in the Company of his brother, Gabriel
Marion.
2 Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register of the
Officers of the Continen tal Army during the War of the
Revolution (Washington: Rare Book Shop Publishing Company,
I nc . , 1914) , p. 379. The cadre for the third regiment
c ame from the first and second, thereby creating vacancies .
. 3 A. C. M. Azoy, "Palmetto Fort , Palmetto Flag, "
American Her itage Magazine, Vol. VI, No. 6 (October, 1955),
p. 63.
They were located at Fort Johnson, later called
Fort Moultrie .
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the battle Moultr ie was promoted to General.

With this

p romotion 1\1:trion assumed command of the regiment and on
September 16, 1776 he was made Lieutenant Colonel
Commandant in the regular (Continental) service . 4

From

that time until just before the fall of Charleston on
May 11, 1780, he commanded various military functions
between Savannah and Charleston . 5

During the British

siege of Charleston by General Clinton, April 2 through
May 11, 1780, Francis Marion broke hi s ankle and was sent
out of the city along with the other wounded, thereby
preventing his capture. 6

4 John Rutledge to the Delegates of the South Carolina
Cong res s , December 30, 1780, Lyman C. Draper I\Ianuscript
Collection, State His tor ical Society of Wisconsin, 1VV8
(Two sections of the Draper Collec ti on will be used in this
paper, The Sumter Papers with the code VV and South Carolina
in the Revolution-Miscellaneous coded as UU.
Subsequent
citations will be noted as Draper Mss, VV or UU, as
applicable.); Simms, op . cit . , p . 77 ; and Heitman, op. cit.,
p . 379 . This was Marion's highest Continental rankthough
he was made a Brigadier of the state militia by Governor
Rutledge in late 1780.
5 General Benjamin Lincoln to Francis Marion,
January 31, 1780, Frederic R. Kirkland (ed.), Letters on
the American Revolution (Philadelphia: Priva tely Printed,
1941), Vol. I, p. 63.
He commanded Fort Moultrie; led
the Second South Carolina Regiment in the abortive assault
against Savannah in October 1779; conducted field operations
with 200 handpicked men in the vicinity of She ldon , South
Carolina .
6 Moultrie, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 65-104. A journal
of the siege of Charleston in .Moultrie's Memoirs reflects
that the enemy actually opened their works on the night of
April 2,. 1780 .
George F. Scheer and Hugh F. Rankin, Rebe ls
and Redco ats (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1957),
pp. 395-399.
Scheer and Rankin stated the ground was broken
o n March 31, 1780. The two sources agree that the
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The countryside around Charleston was swarming with
British soldiers looking for American stragglers wh ich
forced Marion to move constantly .

In his efforts to evade

the British, Marion depended on his friends to hide him
b ut eventually, for his safety and out of patriotism, he
moved north to get back in action .

His movemen ts carried

him to Hillsborough, North Carolina, where he met Baron
Johann DeKalb in July 1780 who headed the advance elements
of a new Southern Army that was to be commanded by General
Horatio Gates . 7

General Gates arrived in Hillsboroug h on

July 27, 1780 and moved his army to South Carolina arriving
on August 5, 1780. 8

Francis Marion and about twenty of his

capitulation was agre ed to on May 11, 1780. Scheer and
Ranki n inferred the siege began on February 11, 1780 with
the arrival of British ships off Charleston. However
Clinton remained idle for eight weeks. Moultrie's date
as the beg innin g of the siege was March 28, the date the
British crossed the Ashley River in force.
P. Horry and
M. L. Weems, The Life of Gen'l Francis Marion (New York:
John W. Lovell Company, 1882) and Wi lliam Dobein James,
A Sketch of the Life of Brig Gen Francis Marion and a
History of His Brigade from its Rise in June 1780 until
Disbanded in 1782 (Marietta, Georgia: Continental Book
Co ., 1948 (a reprint of 1821 edition)), p . 30. Weems
said Marion was visiting in the house of a man who
wanted to display his hospitality.
The host loc ked the
door to prevent anyone from leaving until all had been
provided the best time possible. Weems said that Marion 's
sense of duty caused him to jump from a window to get
away from the party thereby crushing his ankle .
7 McGrady, op . cit . , p. 533 .
.. .8 Moul trie, op. c i .t. , Vol. I I, p . 104 , and New Jersey
Gazette , August 30-,-1780 . The latter contained a quote
from a letter of an officer in the South Carolina line
d ated August 7, 1780, stating that General Gates had
arrived in South Carolina two days earlier at the head of a
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men accompanied Gates' Army . 9

On August 10, 1780 General

Gates, in consultation with Governor John Rutledge,
detached Marion to command an American militia body of
about two hundred men in the vicinity of Williamsburg,
South Carolina, thirty five miles northwest of Georgetown.IO
It was a propitious matching of a man, a force, a time
and an area.

It was the area of Eastern South Carolina,

specifically around Georgetown, that eventually gave more
importance to Marion than he would have otherwise received.
While l\Iarion commanded t hi s militia unit, Au gust
1780 until December 1782, he served under two different
commanders of the Southern Army, Gates and subse quently
General Nathanael Greene .

General Gates was his commander

"
park of art ill ery, Col. Arnold's ~rmand' s] Corps,
a Regiment of Virginia state troops, and a part of South
Carolina refugees, under Col l\Iarion .... "
9 s l.IIlJllS,
·
op. c1··t • , p. 106 an d Rb
o er t D . Bass, Swamp
Fox: The Life and Campaigns of General Francis Marion
(New York: Henry Hol t and Company, 1959 ) , p. 36. The
account of these twent y was attribu ted to Colonel Otho H.
Williams, Gates Adjutant at the time, who said they were
men and boys, black and white but all mounted and miserably
equipped.
10navid Ramsay, The History of South Carolina
(Newberry, South Carolina : W. J. Duff ie, 1858), Vol. I,
p. 231; New Jersey Gazette, August 30, 1780; Weems,
op. cit . , p. 103; Simms, op . cit., p. 120; Bass, op. cit.,
pp. 40-41; James, op. cit-:-:- p~6; and Mcgrady, op. cit.,
p. 651 .
There is much disagreement as to the exact date.
Ramsay said 1 or 2 Au gust . This is disputed by New Jersey
Gazette of August 30, 1780 (see note 8). Weems gave a
date of August 15, 1780. This would appear impossible
becaus e of the battle of Camden on the night of 16 August
1780 and Marion took several days to outfit his band and
conducted two operations before the 17th of August. Bass
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between August 10 and December 4, 1780.

During this

period Marion employed guerr illa tactics, many of which
he had learned during his campaigns against the Indians
in 1759 and 1761. 11

From December 4, 1780 to December 14,

1782 he served under General Greene.

While serving under

Greene he employed both guerrilla and conventional tactics,
the latter beg inning after he seized Georgetown on May 28,
1781. 12

The two commanders', Gates and Greene, overall
strategy differed in one important aspect, speed.

General

Gates moved fast, evidently in h opes o_f a speedy and
decisive victory in the South.

He moved so fast that

his men were virtually starved for weeks before the battle
of Camden on August 16, 1780.

Gates had fa iled to take

time to train the new militia under him, obtain cavalry in

gives a date of August 17, 1780. The same reasoning
applies here as for Weems. McGrady dates it at August 10,
1780, James said August 10 or 12, 1780 and Simms did not
give an exact date . Based on the number of things that
were accomplished between assumption of command and
Gates' Battle of Camden, I b e lieve August 10 is the
most likely.
llJames, op. cit., p. 15. The most important
tactic learned and used was the ambush. Marion had been
caught in an Indian Ambush in 1761 and it made a definite
impression on him.
Marion's first recorded use of the
ambush was on or about 14 August 1780 in an encounter
with the tory, Captain Barefield near the Blue Savannah.
The ambush was successful and became a useful tactical tool .
. ~2Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, May 29, 1781,
Southern History Association Publications, Vol. XI,
pp. 197-198.

6

sufficient numbers to offset the British cavalry superiority ,
or wait for the receipt of intelligence. 13

General Greene,

on the other hand, took his time in moving to meet the
enemy and was careful to prepare himself logistically and
militarily. 14
Although the overall strategic concepts of the two
generals differed, their tactical use of Marion was initially
the same.

Thomas Pinckney, General Gates Aide-de-camp at

the time, said that Gates and Marion had agreed on Marion's
mission of providing intelligence and harassing the enemy's
supply lines before 1Iarion l eft the army to assume command
o f the Williamsburg militia. 15

This mutual agreement of

the use of Marion was exemplified by Marion's actions
after h e left Gates.

His orders to Peter Horry reflect

that Marion must have had intelligence and harassing

13 nic tionary of American Biog raphy (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), Vol. IV, pp . 184-188 .
. 14George Washington Greene, The Life of Major General Nathanael Greene (New York: Hurd and Haughton,
1871 and 1897), Vol. III, pp. 14-19 and 34-67. Greene
stopped along the way south at Philadelphia and Richmond
to obtain troops and supplies . Nathanael Greene to
Francis Marion, January 16, 1781, Southern History
Association, Vol. XI, p. 189 and Greene to Marion,
May 4, 1781, Greene Papers, William L . Clements Library,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan (Hereafter
abbreviated Greene Papers, Clements Library).
Greene
saw the need for a strong cavalry force and requested
horses from the Brigadiers, Sumter and Marion, to outfit
more cavalry .

1 5 Thomas Pinckney, The Historical Magazine, Draper
Mss, 1UU74, and G. W. Greene, op. cit. , Vol III, pp. 26-30 .
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missions. 16

Greene's use of Marion was specific and

clearly documented in correspondence between the two men.
Although Marion's force was important for harassment and
· the gathering of intelligence, Greene also made it c l ear
that "flying parties" such as Marion's were of small
consequence for the great events of war . 17

After the

capture of Georgetown i n May 1781 Greene used Marion
primarily for the defense of Georgetown and as reinforc ements for his army.

Marion was never used as an

independent force to fight pitched battles.

When a

significan t engagement appeared eminent , attachments
were made to Marion's force to assist him. 18

It was

Greene 's idea that a guerrilla mili tia force should harass
the enemy's rear and be kept busy because their tours were
short and they should b e actively engaged while out for
service. 19

16 Francis Marion to Peter Horry, August 17, 1780,
R. W. Gibbes, Documentary History of the American
Revolution (New York: D. Appleton and Co . , 1857), Vol. II,
p. 11.
17 General Lafayette to Nathanael Greene, November 12,
1780, and Francis Mar i on to Greene, December 22, 1780, Greene
Papers, Clements Library .
Greene to Mar ion, December 24,
1780, June 21 and April 10, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III,
pp. 80-81, 100-101 and Vol. II, p. 159.
-18Henry Lee to Nathanael Greene, Janua ry 23, 1781 ,
Greene Papers , Clements Library, and Greene to Thomas
Sumter, February 3, 1781, Draper Mss, 7VV196-198.
19 Nathanael Greene to Thomas Sumter, February 3, 1781,
Draper Mss, 7VV196-198 and Greene to Francis Marion,
February 10, 1781, Southern History Association, Vol . XI,
p. 194.
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Marion's area of responsibility and the dutie s in
the area grew as the campaign in the South turned in favor
of the Americans.

By May of 1782 Francis Marion was

responsible for a mili tary district comprising 9,495
square mil es . 20

The large area of Marion 's responsibiliti es

then included the civil dis tr icts of Cheraw, Georgetown and
Charleston, the latter two comprising about eighty five
per cent of Eastern South Carolina.

The importance of

Marion's area of responsibility was varie d.

Georgetown,

which had been in Marion's possess i on since May 1781, was
the only American port between Wilmington and Charleston .
By the end of the war the supplies that came through the

port of Georgetown in support of the Southern Army were
immense.21

It was in Marion's area that General Greene

locate d his rest and recuperation headquarters, the High
Hills of Santee . 22

The district provided extensive

provisions of rice, cattle and salt.

The rice was grown

in the low areas near the rivers around Georgetown and salt

20 John Matthews to Francis Marion , May 21, 1782,
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol . II, p. 178 and Robert Mills ,
Statistics oTsouth Carolina (Charleston: Hurlbut and Lloyd,
1826), p . 211.
See Appendix A, Flip Number 1.
21 Nathanael Gre ene to Francis Mario n, July 27, 1782,
and Colonel R. Lushington to Marion, October 31, 1782,
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. II, pp . 202 and 245.
22 Nathanae l Greene to Ge org e Wash ington, October 25,
1781, George Wash ington Papers ( Wash ington : Library of
Congress, 1961 ) , Reel 81.
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was produced along the Waccamaw River. 23

The inland areas

of the distri ct were cattle areas upon wh ich Greene
d epended greatly for his meat supply . 24
Control of the seacoast, primarily Georgetown,
provided a more definite communi cation and transportation
system because overland transportation was not only slow
but subject to constant interruption .

The Ame rican port

of Georgetown allowed a speedier and more dependable flow
of commerce .

The rivers radiating out of Georgetown were

l ike the spokes of a whee l, with the town as the hub .

The

excellent navigation afforde d by these rivers as sured
communication, trade and transportation with most of
interior South Carolina.

Charleston , though in Mar ion's

District, remained in the hands of the British .

As the

c u ltural and social center of South Carolina it was the
object of everyone's attention .

Since it was in Marion's

area os responsibility, he was constantly called on to
provide intelligence about Charleston and prevent trade
between the British and the surrounding countryside. 25

23 Mills , op. cit., p. 558, and John Rutledge to
Francis Marion, October 16, 1781, Gibbes , ~- cit., Vol. III,
pp . 190-192.
24 Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, December 27,
1780, Greene Papers, Clements Librar y ; Greene to .M arion,
January 7, 1781, Southern History Association, Vol. XI,
p. 187; Alexander Swinton to Marion, April 28, 1781,
Greene Papers, Cle ments Library; Gre ene to Marion, Dece mber 17,
1781, and Marion to Pe ter Horry, March 8, 1782, op . cit.,
Vol. III, pp. 225 and 266-267.
25John Matthews to Francis Marion, August 29, 1782,
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . II, pp. 215-216 .
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Althou g h Marion's district was important for the
reasons mentione d, the area had to b e understood ideologically, economically and geograph~cally if its va lue
was to be utiliz e d effectively.

The state can be divide d

into two s ections, up country and l ow country .
portions of both in Marion's Distric t.

There were

Cheraw Dis tr ict

was part of the up country while Georgetown and Char l eston
compose d most of the low country.

The different ideo l ogy

of the two areas . was based, to a great extent , on t h e ir
immigration routes.

The majority of the population in

Cheraw and in terior Georgetown Districts e nt ered South
Caro lina from Virginia and Pennsy l vania.

The greatest

numb er of people who settl ed alo ng the seacoast, Georgetown
and Charleston Districts, had come directly from Europe .
These individua l s had entered through Charleston and
revered it as the center of life in South Carolina. 26
The district p roved to b e a great provider of
supplies and prov isions .

The economic importance grew as

the war progressed for several r easons:
Georgetown e xpanded i ts trade;

(a) the port of

(b) the Sout hern portion

of the state below Charleston had been so ravaged that

26willi am A. Schaper, "Secti onalism and Representation
in South Carolina,'' Annual Re o rt of the American Historical
Association for the Year 1900 Washington: Gov ernment
Printing Off i ce , 1901 ) , Vol. I, pp. 248 and 379 and W. W.
Sellers, A History of Mar ion County (Co lumbia, South Carolina:
R. L. Bryan Company, 1902), pp . 78-80 and Mi lls , op. cit . ,
pp . 512, 622, 629 and 740.
-

11

there were ins ufficient provisions in that area, thus
placing greater demands on other parts of the state;
(c) the British in Char l eston were making an effort to
store provis ions in case they were placed under siege
and for their eventual departure from the area. 27

The

low country was typified b y fertile swamplands and a
dense growth of pine and other timber.

This was the

section which produced a large amount of rice, indigo
and naval stores . 28

Of these products, rice was the

most important and pl entious .

The area con tiguous to

Georgetown , with its numerous rivers, was the primary
ric e producing area in the district. 29

The inter i or

portion of the low country and all the up country around
Cheraw wer e cattle r a i sing areas.

Other subsistence

crops were grown there but not i n signif i cant amounts.
Geographic a ll y , Mari on 's dis trict was tied together
by the numerous rivers radiating out of Georgetown.

The

navigabili ty of these r i vers afforded the s ide who contro lled
Georgetown the benefit of communication wi t h a large portion

27 John Matth ews to Francis Marion, April 15, 1782,
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 164-165.
2 8G. W. Greene, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 3.
29Mills, ;~. ;it. , p. 558. Mi ll s states that the
Sampit, Waccamawand Santee Rivers were the most productive
of the ri ver r ice swamps. The best yields per acre for the
best rice fields was abou t 2400 pounds of c lean rice.
The
average was about 2000 pounds or three barrels.
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o f interior South Carolina.

Most of the people were

scattered along the fertile river ba~ks .

Control of the

rivers was therefore necessary to unify the district.
All the rivers which radiated out of George town ,
except the Sampit, were navigable for great distances .
The Black River, which flowed by Williamsburg, was
navigab l e for sixty miles.

The Great Pedee could be

travelled for one hundred and twenty miles passing through
Cheraw, the northern extreme of Marion's district .

The

Lynches and Little Pedee Rivers branc hed off the Great
Pedee and both were passable for at l east seventy miles.
Waccamaw River, which runs parallel to the Atlantic
coastline, was navigable for its entire length--Georgetown
to the Cape Fear River in North Carolina.

The only other

major river in .Marion's district which he controlled was
the Santee.

The mouth of the Santee is about fifteen

miles south of Ge orgetown.

This river could be travelled

to its junction with the Congaree and Wateree Rivers .
From the junction the lat ter t wo were navigable to Columbia
and Camden, respectively . 3 0
As the area described became more important so did
Marion's involvement .

Marion and his district grew together

beginning with 1,256 square miles around Williamsburg,

30Mills, op. cit., pp. 156-160.
The Ashley and
Cooper Rivers, though in .Mar ion 's district, were not
controlled by Marion since they had their mouths at
Charleston which the British con t rolled continuously from
May 1780 until their departur e in December 1782.

13
South Carolina in August 1780. 31

It was not until December 30,

1780 that Marion was assigned a definite area of responsibility.

At that time Governor Rutledge assigned all the

regiments east of the Santee, Wateree and Catawba Rivers
to his unit and announced Marion's promotion to brigadier
in the state militia .
square miles.

The size of this area was about 8,295

The district at that time included an area

bounded by a line drawn from the confluence of the Congaree
and Wateree Rive~s to the northeast until it intersected
Lynches River and included the land east of the Lynches
and the Santee Rivers to the North Carolina line and
Atlantic Ocean . 32
The year 1781 was a year of changing situations in
the South and Marion's area of responsibility was affected
by it.

After General Greene went south following the

Battle ,of Guilford Court House the tide began to turn in
favor of the Americans.

The British , under pressure on

their outposts, pulled the ir force at Camden into Charleston

31 simms, op . cit., pp . 156-157 . Marion's area of
responsibilit y encircled Williamsburg (now Kingstree) out
to a radius of about twenty miles, thus 1,256 square miles.
(A=rr~~ ).
See Appendix A, Flip Number 2.
32 John Rutledge to the De legates ~f the South Carolina
Cong ress, December 30, 1780, and John Rutledge to Thomas
Sumter, January [?] , 1781, Draper Mss , 16VV108-109 and
7VV176-180 .
The area defined by this letter was modified
somewhat when Rutledge allowed the regiment commanded by
Colonel Marshall, located between Lynches and Wateree
River to remain under Sumter's control. See Appendix A,
Flip Number 3 .
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and prepared to evacuate Georgetown. 33

This redistribution

of British forces caused Governor Rutledge, in August 1781,
to add the area between Charleston aud the Santee River to
Marion's District.

The additional area consisted of the

northern portion of Charleston District. 34

The remainder

of Charleston District was assigned to the fourth state
brigadier, General John Barnwell.

Though Barnwell was

in command of the area, it was evident that l\Iarion exercised
considerable influence with the people and General Barnweli.3 5
His influence was such that, on the retirement of General
Barnwell in l\lay 1782, Governor Matthews assigned the
remainder of Charleston District to l\Iarion's area . 3 6

This

33 colonel Nesbit Balfour to Colonel Cassels ~oth
Britis~, March 13, 1781, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. III, p. 37
and Francis l\Iarion to Nathanael Greene April 23, 1781,
Southern History Association, Vol. XI, pp. 196-197. The
pressure consisted of the capture of Forts Watson and l\lotte
by Marion and Lee in April and May. Lee then went on to
capture Fort Granby . This severed the British supply line
between Charleston and Camden . Without Camden and the other
Forts, Georgetown was of no use.
34John Rutledge to Francis l\larion, August 13, 1781,
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 134-135. See Appendix A,
Flip Number~
35Thomas Sumter to Nathanael Greene, July 25, 1781,
Charleston Yearbook of 1899, Appendix A, pp. 48-50; Edmund
Hyrne (Commissary of Prisoners) to Francis Marion, August 18,
1781, Gr eene Papers, Clements Library; Greene to Mar i on,
August 10, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 125-126;
Mar.ion to Greene, September 3~781, Southern Historical
Association, Vol. XI, pp. 198-201; John Barnwell to Francis
Marion, December 12, 1781, Gibbes, £E· cit., Vol . III,
pp. 220-221.
36John Matthews to Francis Marion, May 21, 1782,
Gib bes, op. cit . , Vol. I I, p. 178. Governor Matthews had
been elected Governor at the General Assembl y meeting in
January 1782 .
See Appendix A, Flip Number 1.
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increased his area of responsibility to the largest point
ever, 9,495 square miles. 37
Though Marion's duties had beg un as purely military
in August 1780, they became, by the middle of 1781, more
varied.

As the district grew Marion's responsibilities

increased in number and in scope.

His participation in

purely military matters diminished to those of defense,
while those of an administrative nature, logistics and
local government, grew increasing ly more important and
time consuming .

It is his overall successful accomplishment

of the latter responsibilities that Marion owes the largest
share of his fame , thou g h it has received the l east acclaim .

37Mills, op. cit ., p. 211.

CHAPTER II
THE UNGLAMOROUS RESPONSIBILITY OF RECRUITING
Franc is Mar ion required a body of me n to effect his
missions and this r e quirement increased with the enlargement
of the area of r espons ibility .

The initial need for men

was small since they were used to gather inte lligence and
harass the enemy .

However his responsibility grew to the

point that by May 1782 he needed men to enforce pol i tical
directives, procure supplies, control trade, patrol the
district, and defend Georgetown and other supply poin ts.
Many aut hors have simply mentioned :Marion's force as
Marion's men or Mar i on ' s brigade.

They have refrained

from mention of individuals except i n i solated instances .
This seems to be a wise d ecision because it woul d appear
that most every male in the distric t served with Francis
Marion at o ne time or another.

Many of the men changed

sides, some more than once. 38

An effort wi ll b e made to

examine the genera l categories of all the forces which
served u n der Marion and to consider the specific di rect ives
for recruitment of militia force s .

I f it took a force to

con tro l Marion 's extensive district, it took an even more

38McGrady, op. c i t . , pp . 300-303.
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skillful manager and administrator to recruit and control
the controlling forces.
The soldiers which served in Francis Marion's
district could be generally and simply classified as two
types, Continental and Militi~ but that would be an oversimplification.

The troops of the Continental Line could

and should be further classed.

There were three types of

Continental soldiers in Marion's district .

The first of

these which operated under Marion was not an organized
unit but stragglers and former members of the Continental
establishment whose units were no lon ger intact.

Marion

was one of the stragglers, having just missed capture at
Charleston because of an injury.39

Peter Horry had been

sent out of Char leston as a supernumerary officer and had
joined General Gates force with Marion in July of 1780. 40
Some of the Continental soldiers had escaped from the
British or had been on furlough when their units fell to
the British.

A few of these desired to join other units

in Marion's district .

This was normally allowed until

39James, op . cit., p. 30.
40Nathanael Greene to Peter Horry~ March 29, 1782,
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III, pp. 281- 283.
Supernumerary
officerswerethose officers r eleased during a r eduction
in force.
These officers were normally those who held a
rank which entitled them to a position for which there
were no vacancies, therefore they were released from
active duty . Most of the officers placed in this status
had been so classified just prior to the fall o f Charleston
in May 1780.
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their old units were reformed, a~ which time they wou ld
be recalled. 41

Thes e Con tinentals were, however, a very

small par t of Mar ion's force and were so poorly c l othed
they were almost u sel ess.4 2
The second type Continental soldier was by far the
most effective, but their presence in the district fluctuated
with the overall situation in the Southern Theater.
force was the org anize d unit of Continentals.

This

The best

example of this type force was the legion c avalry of
Henry "Light Hors e Harry" Lee.

His cavalry served

frequentl y and effectively with Mario~. 43

The effectiveness

of Lee was du e , to a g reat degree, to his mobility which
blended well with the mobility of Marion's force.

Francis

41

Francis Marion to Peter Horry, Se ptember 17, 1781,
Gibbes, op. c i t . , Vol. III, p. 168.
This letter cited the
specificcaseof William J ohnson. He had been a soldier
in the Second South Carolina Re g iment and Peter Horry
intended to recruit him into his new cavalry corps.
42 Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene , Januar y 1,
1 781, Green e Papers, Clements Library.
In this letter
Marion stated that he needed at l east one dozen suits of
clothing to outfit the Continentals with him .
43 Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, April 23 and
May 11, 1781, Green e Papers, Clements Library, and G. W.
Greene, op . cit., Vol. III, pp. 133, 134, 233 and 280.
Henry Leearr ived at Greene's camp on January 12, 1781
and was sent to join Marion on January 13, 1781. They
were to work together against Georgetown. Le e was ordered
to join General Mor g an about the e nd of January 1781. He
rejoined Mar ion April 14, 1781 to invest Fort Watson .
Lee had been authorized in a letter, Greene to Lee,
April 4, 1781, G. · W. Greene, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 233,
to do as he thoug ht best. LeeleftMarion again on May 13,
1781. He went west to Fort Granby. Marion remained in
his distric t.
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Mari6n asked General Greene for this kind of force as
early as December 1780.

Marion thou g ht that with a few

Continentals he could be much more effective in preventing
the British from foraging and obtaining provisions. 44

That

request could not be fulfilled by Greene at that time
because he had only 640 Continentals and 450 militia in
his army at Cheraw, South Carolina . 45

But as soon as Lee

and his cavalry arrived in the South, J anuary 1781, they
were dispatched to as s i st Mar ion in attacking Geor getown.
The attack on Georgetown in January 1781 was not
completely successful in that Marion and Lee did n ot take
and occupy the fort.

They did however surprise the garrison

and would have b een successful had they had artillery or
if the guides had not become lost. 46

The transitory nature

of this type unit is best exemplified by the fact that Lee
and this corps of cavalry d e parted Marion a nd went north in
Gre ene's retre at late in January of 1781.

Lee was again

4 4 Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, December 22,
1780, Greene Papers, Clements Library.

45 Theodore Thaye r, Nathanael Greene: Strateg i st of
the American Revolution (New York: 'I\vayne Publications, 1960),
p. 299.
46 Henry Lee to Nathanael Greene , January 25, 1781,
and Francis Marion to Greene , Janu ary 27, 1781, Greene
Papers, Clements Library . There was a difference in the
comments of Marion and Lee concerning the reason that
success was no t complete at Geor getown . Le~ attributed
the failure to the guides becom i ng los t in the night and
Marion said it was because the force did not have artillery .
In his memoirs, Lee softened this and is much l ess critical
of this action at Georgetown .
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attached to General Marion in April and May 1781 during the
siege of Fort Watson and Fort Motte. 4 7

Soon after the

capitulation of Fort :Motte , Lee was detached from Marion .
This detachment left Mar ion with a militia force of onl y
about eighty men .48
The last of the Continental units that served in
Marion's district was an enigma .

This g roup was generally

composed of soldiers who had enlisted for one year, most
of them being natives of Marion's district .
strictly cavalry.

They we re

The first such unit formed was recruited

by Lieutenant Colonel Hezekiah l\Iaham . 49

He had served

u nder Francis l\Iar ion for some time and had distinguishe d
himse lf at Fort Watson .

He was an ingen i ous officer and

had propos ed that a tower be buil t during the siege of
the fort .

He made hi s sugges tion at a time when any hope

of an American victory at the fort had vanished.

The tower

was buil t of logs and ros e to a height above the fort
thereby enabling rifl emen to fire down in the fort .

The

tactic was successful and became commonly known as "Maham's
Tower."

It was us e d several times after this.50

The second

47Francis Marion to Nath anael Greene, April 23 and
May 11, 1781 , Greene P apers, Clements Library.
48s 1mms,
·
·t. , p. 233.
op . ~

49Governor John Mathews to Francis Marion , August 1 4,
1782, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. II, p. 207.
50Franc is :Mar ion to Nath anael Gre_e ne, April 23,
-1 781, Greene Papers, Clemen ts Library .
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unit of this type was one recruited by Lieutenant Colonel
Peter Horry. 51

He was the same Peter Horry who had served

with Marion since Marion assumed comruand in August 1780.5 2
Marion assisted both Maham and Horry in their
recruitment efforts by providing money and p ersonal backing . 53
Even thou gh he helped these fellow officers whom he had
known for so long , they became a constant thorn in his side.
Their recruiting tactics consisted of promising more monthly
pay than that gi~en to the other Continental cavalry.

This

of course hurt the moral e of the cavalry under Greene. 54
Horry impressed horses illegal ly for the use of his cavalry .
This caused Governor Mathews to wr ite Marion to get the
matter straightened out .

It also caused Mathews to take

away the previous authority of impressment of horses from

5 1 John Rutledge to Francis Marion, October 10, 1781
and Peter Horry to Nathanael Greene, October 31, 1781,
Gibbes , op . cit . , Vol. III, pp . 185-188 and 204-205 .
Rutledge's letter of October 10 said that he did not
consider Horry or his regiment on the Continental service
as yet.
In Horry's l etter to Greene, October 31, he
asked Greene his exact status.
Evidently Greene considered
him as part of the Continental line because he allowed him
to operate independentl y .
52 Peter Horry to Nathanael Greene, June 28, and Jul y 13,
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library .
5 3Peter Horry to Nathanael Greene·, June 28, 1781,
Greene Papers , Clements Library.
54 Nathanael Greene to Peter Horry, February 1 and 14,
1782, Gibbes , op. cit . , Vol. III, pp. 247-251.
Greene
inferred that their pay was $25.00 per month which was more
than his cavalry.
Greene stated that he hoped the amount
over the regular pay was in the form of land bounties .
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all people, to include Marion . 55

But the biggest drawback

of these two units was their independent activity.

Although

General Marion had helped them recruit , they wou ld not turn
out to assist him in the district.

When their assistance

was requested they would either refuse on the grounds
that they obeyed only General Greene's orders, or they
would furnish a token force, poor ly armed and provisioned . 5 6
Their mere presence thwarted British forays into Marion's
district but that same presence was more trouble than
a ssistance for Marion. 57
It is odd that the very troops which were often
accused of ineffi ciency , in competency and lack of staying
power were the very f orces wh ich formed the b ackbone of
Francis Marion's District.
the militia .

The troops r eferred to are

One should not suppose however . that the

militia under Francis Marion were free from such accusations.
Their leader was often upset over their discipline, desire,
patriotism and ability.

When Marion furnished a report of

his strength to Gen eral Gates in November of 1780, he

55John Mathews to Francis Marion, April 10, 1782,
Gibbes, op . cit ., Vol. III, pp. 157-158. When it was
decided to raise the two c·o rps of cavalry under Maham and
Horry, the Governor granted them the authority to impress
(take from the people) horses to mount the cavalry.
56Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, Au gust 18 and
20; 1781; and Greene to Mar ion, August 2, 1781, Greene Pape rs,
Clements Library.·
57 Francis Marion to Peter Horry, September 23, 1781,
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III, pp. 171-172.
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cautioned General Gates not to b ecome overly happy with
the turn out because he seldom had the same men a fortnight.
He did not expect this to change un ti l the "Grand Army
is on the Banks of Santee. 1158

Marion was unhappy with

the g oing and coming of the militia, even stating that
the militia and the ir i nstab ility were the r ea l causes of
his desire to resign in May 1781.

The militia exasperated

Marion b ecau se they frequently left "at the very point of
executing a plan," and they co nti nually left him at the
most critical times.5 9
Just as the militia turn out for service fluctuated,
so did the impressions of their commande rs.

Marion's men

never failed in any set confront ation with the enemy .
They were never accused of retreating i n anything but an
orde rly manner.

Theirs was frequently an orderly retreat

but never a disorderly rout.

General Greene was genera lly

please d with the performance of the mil i tia under Generals
Sumter, Marion and Clarke.

He wrote Alexander Hamilton on

that poin t saying that the militia unde r them were "bold
and daring; the rest of the militia are better cal culated
to destro y provisions than oppos e the enimy [sic] , 11 60

On

5 8Francis Marion to Horatio Gates, November 22, 1780,
Greene Papers, Clements Library .
59 Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, May 11, 1781,
Greene Papers, Clements Library.
60 Nathanae l Greene to Alexander Hamilton, J anuary 10,
-1781, Harold C. Syrett (ed . ), The Papers of Alexander
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some occasions Marion was optimistic of good turn outs of
the militia.

Just nine days after he had threatened to

resi gn because he could not count on the militia, he
reflected such optimism.

He said that though most of the

militia had gone home, he expected a big return in a few
d ays which would make him stronger than he had ever been. 61
At times General Greene was so upset over the small number
of men and the inabili ty to recruit Continental troops
that he entertained the idea of recruiting Negro soldiers. 62
The laws and regulations governing militia duty were
varied and involved .

The militia law in effect when Marion

assumed command had been passed on February 13, 1779. 6 3
Although an effort was made to follow and enforce that
law, it was seriously outdated.

It must be remembered that

when the law of 1779 was passed, the American Army controlled
almost all of South Carolina.

After the fall of Charleston

Hamilton, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961),
Vol. II, p . 530, Green e to Francis Marion , April 24, 1781,
Greene Papers, Clements Library, and Greene to Marion,
Augu st 31, 1782, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. II, p. 217.
In
the lat te r letter Greene said he was happy to hear of the
bravery and firmness of the militia under Marion and wished
it was the same in every part of the state.
61Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, May 20, 1781,
Greene Papers, Clements Library.
62 Nathanae l Gr eene to George Washington, March 9,
1782, George Wash ington Papers, op. cit., Reel 83.
63John Rutledge to Francis Mar i on, September 26,
1781, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, pp. 173-175.
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in May, 1780, and with the British assumption of control,
this law was worth little more than the paper on which it
was written.

As General Greene's army gained strength and

controll ed more of the formerly British occupied territory ,
the need arose for mor e applicable militia laws.
Governor John Rutledge personally initiated most of
the needed laws.

He had been given great powers just

prior to the fall of Charleston which some people have
called dic tatorial . 64

But to think that Governor Rutledge

singularly and summarily changed all the militia laws
would be an incorrect assumption.

He solicited the ideas

and opinions of Generals Greene, Marion, Sumter and others
who wer e knowledge able and avai l able . 65

This was an

emergency and Rutledge rose to the occasion .

Rutledge

did not d esire to run the recruitment effort in such a
catchall fashion.

He wanted a stable state and desired

good civil government. 66

. 6 ~Margaret Burnham Madlillan, The War Governors in
the American Revolutio n (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1943), p. 231.
65 John Rutledge to Francis Marion, September 15,
1781, Gibbe s, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 162-163.
In this
letter Rutledgeasked Marion's ideas on the feasibility of
granting a pardon for previous British sympathizers to
come over.
He asked several specific questions about how
Marion thought the present patriots would react to such a
proc lamation.

)
i)

66John Rutledge to
September 2 and 14, 1781,
pp. 126-127 and 159-160.
Justices of the Pe ace for
military distr ict.

Francis Marion, August 13,
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III,
Rutledgeasked Marion to appoint
all the civil districts in his
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Militia recruitment was not going we l l in mid- 1781 .
The fall of the British posts between Charleston and Camden
h a d lulled t~e people into a false sense of security and
the people in Marion's district wer e no different.

They

woul d t u rn out readily to defend their homes bu t not
someone elses.

General Thomas Sumter 's fie l d officer

ranks had been greatly depleted .

He laid the blame for

this on the field officers who had "imprudently g one upon
private and dis graceful business . "

If the field grade

o fficers were so "imprudent ," it would seem only normal
that the privates would be as or more imprudent.

Sumter

had found i t h ar d to r ecru it and asked Greene for
assistance . 67
Governor Rut l edg e normally remained with or very
n ear Gen e ral Greene's h eadquarters to insure quick
c oordination.

However Rutledge was in Philadelphia

during the summer of 1781 (l\lay, Jun e and July), thus
slowing down reaction tim e .

When he returned h e took

positive action to reali gn the militia to make sure that
an adequate force was in the field at all times .

The

previous call out system of the militia had consisted of
irregularly calling up companies and regiments .

The

draft to report for du ty occurred as the result of both
real and imagined emergenc ies .

There had been no set

67 Thomas Sumter to Nathanael Greene , April 7, 1781,
Draper Mss, 7VV232-236.
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system of time of service established b y t he law of 1779 .
When the law was enacted in 1779 the militia wer e to b e
called up as needed.

In 1781 a force was necessary on a

more permanent basis but it was c l ear that all the men
could not serve continuously.
Governor Rutledge's first di rective to insure a
standing force was in the form of l etters to his b r i gadi ers,
Sumter and Marion .

I t was issued on September 2, 1781.

The militi a r egiments were to be divided into two equa l
parts.

Each divi s ion would serv e one month on duty and

one month at home.

This splitting of uni ts was to go down

to the c ompany level.

I n Rut l e d ge's l etter one could

cl ear ly see the dictatorial powers of the Governor.

He

cons idered anyone who failed to turn out for mil itia duty
as being the enemy of the state.

I n that case, the b riga di er

was to s en d the offender into the British lines and take
all his property for the use of the state.

He further

stated that all men who had been paroled b y t h e British
without the faith of an officer were considered as liberated. 68
The liberat i on from p aroles set the stage to deny men the
opportunit y to shirk militia duty based solely on their
contention of b e ing on Br{tish parole.69

6 .8 John Ru t l edge to Francis Marion , September 2, 1781,
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, p. 131. The faith of an officer
here infers that .the parole was signed by an officer and the
officer guaranteed the stipul at i ons of the parole, i. e .,
the Bri tish would n ot vio l ate the ir part of the agreemen t.
69John Rutledge to Francis Marion , October 5, 1781,
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 178-180.
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The directive concerning militia service of
September 2, 1781 was modified and expanded by the Governor
on September 26 of the same year.

At that time he directed

that the militia be divided into three classes (divisions)
rather than the previous two.

The time of service was to

be for two months on duty and four months off duty for
each of the divisions.

This system would cut down lost

time on duty as the militia considered the ir tours as
running from the time they lef t home un ti l they returned.
This time of service applied only for military us e in
areas more distant than e i ghty miles ~rom their homes.
If there was an enemy threat within e i ghty miles of their
home they could and would be called out more often for as
lon g as necessary.

In that l etter the Governor specified

a fine for failure to do militia duty.

The fine was not

to exceed one hundred and fifty pounds specie plus three
times the amount of tax the offender paid before the militia
law of February 1779.

He also prohibited the use of

substitutions in the future. 70
The prohibition of subst i t ution had a significant
effect on recruitment in Francis Marion's district.

It

70John Rutledge to Francis Marion, September 26, 1781,
and Rutledge to Peter Horry, October 22, 1781, Gibbes, op .
cit., Vol. III, pp . 173-175 and 194-195. Rutledge to Thomas
Sumter, October 28, 1781, Draper Mss, 7VV512-513 .
It was
in Rutledge's letter of September 26 that he discussed
inflation which had hi t the state and he equat ed 150 pounds
of specie to 500 pounds of c urrent money.
The previous
ratio had been equal.
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also posed an enforcement problem for Marion.

Peter Horry

was quite concerned about the stopping of substitution .
He believed it .would bring his recruiting effort to an end
because substitutions were his great est source of manpower .
Horry also cited Rutledge's directive of requiring him to
en l ist men for a term of three years rather than ten months
or a year as a major deterrent to recruitment.71

Governor

Rutledge did honor the previous substitutions and granted
exemption from militia duty to those who had hired
s u bstitutes . 72
Perhaps Governor Rutledge 's major decision was the
issuance of his proclamation of pardon on September 27,
1781.

In this proclamation he encouraged people to return

to the Coloni al side.

They were given a period of thirty

days to present themselves before one of the brigadiers
of the state and petition for acceptance .

The responsibility

for enforcement fell to the brigadiers and caused a great
deal of unglamorous work .

The administrative burden was

magnified by the research required.

Each individual

applying for pardon had to b e checked to d etermine whet h er
he fell in one of the exception categories.

The proclamation

opened the American doors to all individuals except those

71Peter Horry to John Rutledge, October 30, 1781,
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III, pp. 200-203 .
7 ~John Rutledge to P eter Horry, October 22, 1781,
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol . III, pp . 194-195 .
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who could be c lassed in one of the fol lowing five categori es:
1 ) Those who had gone over to the enemy and had not answered

the pardon ~roclamations i ssued by Governor Rutledge on
t wo previous occasions to turn themselves in to a Magistrate
within forty d ays; 2) Those who had signed congratulatory
address es to Admiral Arbuthnot and General Clinton on
June 5, 1780 or to General Cornwallis on September 19,
1780; 3) Those individuals who held civil or military
commissions in the British Government; 4) Those p eople
whose infamous condu ct did not entitle them to the rights
and privileges of Americans; 5) And to those who had
r efu sed to take an oath of allegiance before the fa ll of
Charleston in May 1780.
It is simple to see that the brigadiers were
saddled with a tremendous admi nistrat i ve burden as a
r esult of this proclamation.

They were to be the approv ing

authorit y for all pardon applicants.

I f the b rigadier

petitioned refused to allow the pardon to anyone, he was
to insure the safe conduct of the applicant back to the
British lines .

The pardon did not come free.

The men

who accepted the pardons were required to serve six months
continuous duty with the militia beginning at the time of
the ir surrender.

They were to subsequently serve in the

same manner as all others, two months duty and four months
at home.

I f any of them d eserted, their families would
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be sent away immediately into the British lines and never
allowed to return. 73
Governor Rutledge viewed the proclamation as having
several significant effects.
recruitment efforts.
to the British.

It assisted in American

It denied use of those individuals

Lastly, it afforded a person the opportunity

to return to his home rather than serve a life in exile. 74
The proof of the effectiveness of form er Loyalists as
American soldiers was g iven by Thomas Sumter.

He had

found that they were quite useful and did their duties
well, provide d they were treated as pe_ople in the American
service ought to be.

By January 1782, Sumter had "upwards

of one hundred of these men" serving in his brigade . 75
Governor Rutledge had thus spent all September 1781
issuing directives to assist and enforce militia recruitment.
He spent most of Octobe r 1781 clarifying his instructions.
The Governor then turned his eff orts toward the establishme nt
of a General Assembly to pass laws to return the state to
civil control and assist the military effort. 76

The d es ired

7 3Proclamation by Governor Rutledge , Sep tembe r 27,
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 175-178.
74John Rutledge to Francis Marion, September 15,
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 162-163 .
75 Thomas Sumter to Nathanael Greene, . January 2,
1782, Charleston Yearbook of 1899, App. A, pp . 68- 69 .
76 John Rutledge to Francis Marion, November 23, 1781,
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 214-215 . Marion was directed
to conduct elections for an assembly to b e h e ld about the
first of the year (1782 ) .
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assembly did not convene until January 8, 1782 at
J acksonborough, South Carolina . 7 7

When the assembly

met , several laws were passed in an Bffort to improve
t he mi l itia of the state and raise a Continental force .
They were overshadowed however by the Confiscation Act. 7 8
Even the Confiscation Act was designed to assist the state
militarily to provide money and land for equipment and
recruitment bounties. 79
The most ~mportant of the acts passed for the control
o f the mi l itia was number 1267.

Its purpose was to insure

that a l l men between the ages of sixteen and fifty years
performed duty.

Each Captain in a company district was

required to take the names of all the men in the district
every two months.

This list was passed up the line until

i t got to the Governor.

The list could be used to verify

which soldiers were in the Continental line.

All those

not in the Continental line were required to be in the
mi l itia.

Any man found in a company district could and

would be made to serve in that unit unless he had a
certificate of service as proof that he was in another

7 7 Moultrie, op . cit., Vol. II, p . - 305 .
78 General Assembly of the State of South Carolina,
Laws Enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South
Carolina, January 8 to February 25, 1782 (Philadelphia:
1782) .

7 ~Francis Marion to Peter Horry, February 1 0, 1782,
Gibbes , op . cit., Vol. III, p. 249 and Moultrie, op . cit . ,
Vol. II, pp.~1-327 .
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uni~.

The Governor had authority to replace officers who

resigned or were killed.

The rank of full Colonel was

replaced by that of Lieutenant Colonel Commandant.

No

one was to be appointed to the rank of full Colonel after
the date of the act.
The service and call up system of the militia was
greatly altered and showed significant thought.

The

militia draft was to consist of one-fourth of each unit .
Service was seasonal.

During the months of April, May ,

June and July the tour of duty was only one month for each
one-fourth of the militia.

This allowed minimum abs e nce

from home by the citizen so ldiers during their critical
farmin g times.

During the other eight months of the year

the tour was to be two months for each one-fourth of the
militia.

These tours were for duty against threat s in

excess of eighty miles from their homes .

All the militia

of an area could be called at any time for any length if
the threat was within eighty miles of their home.

The

regular tours allowed for replacement of reliefs and
authorized the officers to retain them for an additional
ten days to insure the next relief had arrived .
This new act was viry spec ific .

If a man reported

late or with the improper uniform and equipment, h e could
be required to perform double duty.

Section six of the

act prescribed of·fens es and maximum punishments.

The

punishme nt for the most serious offenses was service in
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the Continental line .

The lesser offenses were punishable

by additional service with · the militia.

This law also laid

down court-martial requirements and direct ives which were
helpful in discipline bu t t ime consuming for the militia
leaders.
The various company and regimental militia commanders
were responsible for the local security in their home
districts.

This act required them to form six man patrols

to enforce laws and k eep the peace.

This duty was not

considered as part of the reg ular militia duty .

The act

further ruled on substitution and impressment of military
stores.

These two issues had previously been problem areas

for Governor Rutledge and the b rigadiers.

Impressment of

provisions, fora ge , hors es , wagons , boats and other
necessities was authorized .

The impressor was direct e d

to provide a receipt for any items taken and the receipt
was to be accompanied by appraisals of the fair value of
the property by three free holders .

This was an att empt

to cut down on and regulate plundering.
The ruling on substitutes was clarified.

Those

men who had hired substitutes for the independent cavalry
corps like Maham's and Horry's were still exempt.
exemptions were altered b y the new act.

These

The exemptions

were in force until their substitutes enlistment expired.
At that time the men who had hired substitutes were
required to enter the militia service.

The act did
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require those exempted individuals to assist in local
patrol dut y on a regular basis like everyone else. 80
John Mathews was e l ected Governor during the
meeting of the legislature in February 1782 thereby placing
the r esponsibi lity for enforcement and interpretation of
the new militia law on him.

He did not enjoy the same

d egree of authority as had Rutledge but he did have a new
and viable militia law.

He also had sufficient power to

make interpretations and issue directives with re gard to
his interpretations.

The assembly had assisted Mathews

by passing anothe r act to provide for better def e nse and
s ecur ity while the assembly was not in session. 81

Mathews

did howe ver make some changes with regard to the tours of
duty, directing a return to the two months service in the
militia and four months at home . 8 2
Governor Mathews also decided on the method of
handling people who came in from the enemy lines.

They

80 General Assembly of the State of South Carolina,
1782, op. cit . Such a policy of placing serious offenders
in theContinental Army sure ly did not strengthen the Army
and probably accounted for many desertion cases . The
militia, with the l esser offenders was not muc h better.
However, the need for men and the requirement for some
sort of punishment allowed little, if a~y, alternative.
81 ibid.
8 2 John Mathews to Francis Marion, March 3, 1782,
Gibbes, op. c it., Vol. III, pp. 261-262. The militia law
of 1782 had stipulated that during the primary months of
planting the militia forc e was to be divided in four equal
groups and serve one month duty and three months at home.
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were to appear before the Governor or one of the brigadiers
to determine whether they should b e allowed to come over
to the American side.

I f found worthy, they could either

post two good and sufficient sureties as proof of their
intentions to act in good faith .

I f this was not possible

they would b e allowed to find two substitutes to serve in
the South Carolina Continental forces.

I f the substitutes

could not be found in a reasonable time, the individual
was required to perform six months constant duty with his
respective brigade. 83

I t is clear that substitution was

o nce again approved b y the state .

Gove rnor Mathews was

explicit in his directive conce rnin g the matter of
substitutes .

If an individual d es ired to be exemp t from

militia duty and he was under fifty years of a ge he had
to provide two substitutes but if he was over fifty he
had to find only one substitute .84
The militia organization, regardless of the number
of laws and directives published was, in the words of
General Greene, "loose and irregular."

He had found the

turn out of the militia forces to be both embarrassing

83 John Mathews to Francis Marionr March 18,
1782, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, p. 276.
84 John Mathews to Francis Marion , September 13,
1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp . 226-227. By this
time the evacuation of Charleston was c lose at hand.
The British intentions had been made public in midAugust 1782.
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and alarming . 85

He could not unde r stand why the people

d id not wan~ to help wi th the war effort . 86

The enforcement

of the militia laws , wh i ch fe ll on the shoulders of the
General s , Sumter, Marion and Picke ns, was admittedly
d ifficult and time consuming.

But they were to use their

own best judgmen t in rulin g in eac h individual case.8 7
It would b e a gross understatement to say that the
turn out of militia f luctuated.

After reporting for duty,

the ir tenure remained constantl y in doubt .

Many different

factors affected t h e recruitment and retention of the
militia.

Since the economy was predominantly a gr icultural,

they were greatl y in terested in be ing home du r i ng the
plant in g season . 88

As fam il y men, wh i ch most were, they

were constant l y concerned for the safety of their wives
and children . 89

Many of the me n, particularly those

around Georgetown and Char l eston, h ad l arge estates and
a number of slaves.

They were therefore concerned about

the situation at their homes and whether their slaves had

85Nathanae l Gr ee ne to George Washin g t on , February 28,
1781, George Washington Papers,.££· cit . , Ree l 7 5.
8 ~Nathanae l Greene to Francis Marion, June 25, 1781,
Gibbes , op . cit . , Vo l . III, pp . 100-101 .
87 John Rutledge to Franc i s Marion , October 16 , 1781,
Gibbes , op . cit., Vol . III, pp. 190-192.
8 8simms , pp. 241-245 .
89 Francis Marion to Horat io Gates, October 4, 1780,
Draper Mss, 7VV67-69.
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run away or b een carried off.

With these concerns on their

minds, many vacillated between allegiance to British and
American causes . 90

There were some who turned out to

fight Loyali sts simply because of their intense hatred
for them .
As the war slowed down in 1782, it b ecame more
difficult to get the militia out for service .

The danger

was not eminent and they could see no reason to search
for the enemy. 91

Many of the most staunch supporters

were discouraged over the open-armed acceptance of their
former enemies.

The people of Cheraw District under

Colonel Lamb Benton were particularly unhappy with the
treaty General Mar ion had signed with the Loyalists on Little
Pe dee River under .Maj or l\Iicaj ah Ganey in June of 1781.
The treaty, as we shall see later, made considerable
concessions to the Loyalists and r equired them to serve in
the militia.

But Colonel Benton and his people were

appalled that although they had been repeatedly plundered
by the Loyalists under Ganey they still provided their
militia quota to Marion's brigade.
their equals.

Now the Loyalis ts were

This caused considerable distress and the

90 colonel Lord Rawdon ~ri tishj to Sir Henry
Clinton, Jun e 6, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit ., Vol. III,
pp. 90-91 and Thayer, op. cit. ,pp. 403-404.
91 John Mathews to Francis Marion, September 18,
1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 228.
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Cheraw Regiment withheld many of their men on the pretense
of l ocal def.ense. 92
Once the militia had reported, there was little or
no guarantee they would remain . 93

The reten t ion of the

forces was also effected b y many factors.

It has been

pointed out previously that the men under Marion never
ran from a fi g ht.

They were not however always anxious

to chase the enemy too far from home just to fight him.
They wanted to defend their hom es bu t not someone else's. 9 4
On many occasions there was no money with which to pay the
militia or the Contine ntals. 95

When General Green e

directed Marion to provide him with horses , many of the
militia left .

They knew the irs were the only horses

available and they did not wan t to g ive them up. 96

The

92 colonel Lamb Ben ton to John Mathews , August 20,
1782, and Articles of Agreement b etween Colonel Peter Horry,
in behalf of General Marion, and Major Ganey, June 17, 1781 ,
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 98-99 and 128.
93 Francis Marion to Peter Horry, September 14, 1781,
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol . III, pp . 160-161 and Marion to Hor atio
Gates, November 22, 1780, Greene Papers , Clements Library .
94 Francis Marion to Thomas Sumter, June 23, 1781,
Draper Mss, 7VV381 and Sumter to Nathanael Greene, July 17,
1781, Charlestown Yearbook of 1899, App. A, pp. 41 - 43 .
This situation occurred enroute to fight Colone l Coates at
Bigg in Church .
95 Francis Marion to Peter Horry, May 20, 1782 , and
John Mathews to Marion, September 13, 1782, Gibbes, op . cit.,
Vol. II, pp. 175 and 226-227 . Money from substituteswa~
to be used for Contine ntal recruiting and not for militia pay.
96simms, op. cit . , pp. 241-245.
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militia were tired of false promises and needed some
positive signs of good intentions by the government.
They did not think they had been treated properly.

They

were constantly confronted b y criticism and very little
by appreciation. 97

The final reason many of the militia

troops left was simple--they just did n ot want to remain
in the field for more than one month at a time. 9 8
The methods of recruitment were similar to those
of all times .

The British accused the Americans of brutal

punishmen t, threats, and intimidations to get the former
British subjects to come over the American side. 99

There

were similar claims a g ainst the British that they burned
houses and threa tened the people with f ire and the sword
if they went over to the American side. 100
method was equally famili ar , rewards .

The other

The American

Army's offer to men who would volunt eer for the cavalry

97 Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, May 6, 1781,
Greene Papers , Clements Library.
98 Francis Marion to Nathanael Green e , July 24,
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library.
99 colonel Lord Rawdon to Sir He nry Clinton, June 6,
1781, Gibbes op. cit., Vol. III, p p . 90-91, and Colonel
Robert Gray tBri tislf] , "Observations on the War in Carolina, 11
North Carolina University Magazine , Vol . VIII, November
1858, Draper Mss, 17VV42 (Colonel Gray served in the
Revolutionary War in South Carolina as a Captain), and
Proclamation of Lord Rawdon and Colone l Nesbit Balfour,
May 24, 1781, Gibbes , op. cit . , Vol. III, pp . 88-89;
British In telligence Reportfrom Char l es ton, December 27,
17 81, Penns y lvania Packet , January 26, · 1782 .
lOOHoratio Gat es to Congress , (Extract), November 14,
1780, Maryland Gazette, December 15, 1780 .
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under Peter Horry and Hezekiah Maham was exhorbitant.
guaranteed annual pay was in the form of slaves.

The

A full

Negro slave was considered to be between ten and forty
years of age.

His value was about $400 .

The annual pay

r anged from three grown plus one small Negro for Colonels
to one grown Negro for Privates .

As additional incentives

to join, the men were promised two-thirds of all the
c aptured enemy items except Negroes and military stores.
There were the further enticements of sword, pistol,
horse, bridle , saddle and uniform . 101

All this could

not help but inspire the young adventurer.

It was for

this type unit that the prominent men hired subst i tutes
to obtain exemptions for themselves from militia duty.
Militia pay was not, however , as great or glamorous.
Prior to September 17, 1781 the pay had been _ ten shillings
per day for privates.

Governor Rutledge raised this to

a littl e more than thirty-two shillings after that date.

1 02

Francis Marion had the responsibility for insuring
that everyone in the district performed militia du ty in
accordance with the law.

Surely law enforcement occupied

as much of his time as did military operations.

Marion's

l 0lcolonel Richard Hampton to Major John Hampton,
April 2, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 47-48 .
The term "full Negro slave" was used a s a unit of measure
for payment of bounties to sol diers . For purposes of
computation, a full slave was between ten and forty years
of age .
l0 2 John Rutledge to Francis Marion, September 17,
1781, Gibbes , Vol . III, pp . 163-166.
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methods of enforcing the militia laws did not always
reflect the image of "Robin Hood."

His directive to

Peter Horry required Horry to go out and arrest a few
shirkers and place them in jai1. 103

Governor Rutledge

had g iven Marion the authority to condemn shirkers from
militia duty to service in the Con t inental li ne.

I f it

is hard to imagine the daunted "Swamp Fox" operating in
this manner, it must be remembered that recruitin g was a
military necessity.

l0 3 Francis Marion to Peter Horry, January 12,
.1782, Gibbes, ~- cit., Vol. III, pp. 231-232.

CHAPTER III
THE LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS OF MARION
Leadership is defined the same for a ll military
commanders .

I t is the ability to i nf l uence others .

Specific differences in the l eadership of military
commanders are the problems which confront them and
how they handle them .

Leaders hip problems are never

simp l e and this was no except ion in Marion's case.

His

j ob was made more dif f icult by h is l eadership tasks,
thereb y occupyin g much of his time.

I n an effort to

show how time consuming and all encompassing Mar i on's
l eadership problems were, these following problem areas
wil l be di scussed :

(a) Maintenance of morale of the

p eople in his district by protecting their families and
property from Americans and British;

(b) Assuring his

men that every effort wou ld be made in the ir behalf to
free them if captured;

(c) Problems of jealousy and

personality conflicts between two of his commanders ,
Lieutenant Colonels Peter Horry and Hezekiah Maham .
Even though Marion was constantly concerned and
busy taking care of his men and their we l fare and sol ving
dispu~es among the officers h e had to consider the
prope rty of the civilians in his district .

I f he could

not assure the citizens that he could protect their
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p ro~erty from both British and American plunderers he
wou l d not have any support.

The support these people

rendered was partly in the form of equipment, intelligence
and provisions .

Their greatest contribution however

was the militia.

These men would not have turned out

to fo l low Marion if they had not thought their wives,
children and property would be safe during their absence.
Marion was aware of the terrible effects that would
result if forces plundered the property of Americans
or Loyalists.

He was in the business of retaining the

patriots on the American side and win~ing the Loyalists
over-- by good treatment if necessary .

General Marion

informed General Gates in Octobe r 1780, before Marion's
district had been specifically outline d, that several
groups, under the guise of partisans, were plundering and
burning houses .

The officers mentioned were Colonel

Ervin and Captain Murphy.

They had both left Marion's

force because he would not tolerate the burning of any
houses .

Marion wanted Gates to know of their actions

b ecause he feared the blame would be laid on him.

He

said that the thing he detested most was the distressing
of women and children . 10 4 ·

l0 4 Francis Marion to Horatio Gates, October 4 and 15,
1 781, Draper Mss, 7VV67-68 . There is no information about
Colonel Ervin or -Captain Murphy. There is a later mention
of a Colonel Irvin (March 1781) who was one of Marion's
Regimental Commanders.
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This was not the only occasion on which Francis
Marion reprimanded his own forces about pillage and plunder.
He accused some of Peter Horry's officers and men of
infraction s several times .

He referred these accusations

to Governor Rutledge and General Greene because of Green e 's
independent us e of Horry. 105
Hez ek iah Maham.

He had similar problems with

He and his men were accused of burning a

British hospitai. 106

I n Horry's case the acts were committed

a ga inst militiamen in Mar i on ' s own brigade. 107

Maham and

Horry, while recruiting their independe nt cavalry forces
took more provisions, equipmen t and horses from the people
in the district than was prope r.

On one occasion, Colone l

Maham impressed a h orse b e longing to John Oliver .
ordered 1Iaham to return it.

:M arion

Maham refused and the reply

gave Marion the impression that Maham b e lieved Marion had
overstepped his authorit y .

Marion threatened a court-

105Francis Marion to Peter Horry , September 23,
1781, ·J ohn Rutledge to Horry, October 27, 1781, Mar ion
to Horry, October 29, 1781, Horry to Rutledge, October 30,
1781,. and Rutledg e to Horry, November 4, 1781, Gibbes ,
op . cit., Vol. III, pp. 171-173, 198-203 and 206.
l06Doyle (!3ritisl!) to Francis Marion, November 20,
1781, and Nathanael Green~ to Marion, November 24, 1781,
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 213, 215-216.
lOJJohn Rutledge to Peter Horry, October 27, 1781,
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 198-199.
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martial and the horse was returned.

As a result of this

incident Governor Rutledge revok e d all impressment warrants . 1O8
But even thou gh Marion made an effort to control and
discipline his troops concerning plunder, he (Marion) was
accused of plundering by the British .1O9

On one occasion

General Greene, Marion's commander, accused Marion of taking
horses for the use of the mi l itia which Greene thought could
be put to better use by his Continental forces .

With regard

to differentiat ion between military stores taken by Greene
and the plundering of the militia, Greene easily rationalized
his own needs .

For instance , the horses ridden in combat

by the militia, even though taken from Loyalists, should,
in Greene's opinion , be ridden by Continentals.

Greene was

upset b ecause h e knew the horses were being u sed only onethird of the time .

Greene later retracted his accusation.

This accusation hurt l\larion's command, and t h e men under
him, fearful that Greene woul d take their hors es , left
Marion and returned home, taking the horses with them . 11O

l0 8 John Rutledge to Peter Horry, September 25,
1781, Francis Mar ion to Hezekiah Maham, October 18, 1781,
Rutledge to Marion, Oc tober 24 , 1781, Gibbes, op . cit.,
Vol. III, pp. 172, 194, 196-198.
-l09colonel Watson to Francis Mar ion, March 9, 1781,
Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. III, pp~ 33-34 .
llONathanael Greene to Francis Marion, May 4, 1781,
Greene Papers, Clements Library . Greene had previously
mention ed his need for dragoon horses and was angry that
Marion's militia had horses and he did not.
This accusation
hurt Marion and was one reason he threatened to resign .
Governor John Mathews to Marion, June 15, 1782, Gibbes ,
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The problems of plundering encountered by Marion
were made worse by the different views and interpretations
held by individuals as to what constituted plunder.

Colonel

Watson of the British wrote Marion that he did not intend
to assist his enemy.

He considered " the burning of hous es

and the property of the inhabitants, who are our enemies,
is customary in all civilized nations," but he was against
distressing the families of the enemy . 111

General Greene

had a similar phjlosophy and considered anything necessary
for milita ry operations as b e ing fair game . 112

It is hard

for a person to consider the burning of a hou se as fair
and still not distress the family who inhabits the d wel ling .
It was Marion's duty to execute the orders of hi s s uperiors .
To pass down directives, like Greene did as the commander ,
and to enforce the directives , like Mar ion did, are
entirely di fferent .

Marion made every effort to be

spec ific when he sent his men out to attack the enemy .
His orders reflected his desire to on l y inflict damage on
military or military support items .113

op . cit., Vol. II, pp . 190-191 .
In this letter Mathews
encouraged Mar ion to do something with the militia under
him.
Mathews considered them to be the most " incorrigibly
obstinate and perverse beings" h e had ever met wit h.
111 colonel Watson to Francis Marion , March 16,
1781, Gibbes, Vol . III, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
~ 12Nathanae l Greene to Thomas Sumt er , April 15,
1781, Charlestown Yearbook of 1899, App. A, pp. 88-90 .
113 Franc i s Marion to Adjutant John Postell,
December 30, 1780, Marion to Postell, January 19, 1781,
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The problem of plundering became more critical
when the items plunde red were to be used as part of the
men's pay.

With plunder as incentive to join the

Continental cavalry units like those of Horry and
Maham, it was difficult, rather impossible, to comp l etely
prevent plundering.

Recruits were enlisted under the

promise that they could retain two-thirds of all articles
captured.

They would no t b e all owed to keep items

b elonging to other patriots, but that was difficult to
regulate.

By the failur e to stop this practice, the

state government implied that i t agreed with the practice . 114
Governor Rutl edge did little to assist Gene ral Marion in
the prosecution of men accused of plundering in early 1781.
He answered Marion ' s requ est for authority to punish by
havin g General Greene write Marion and offer courtmartial orders to try the men militarily .
for civil prosecution was g iven . 115
Rutledge had changed his approach .

No authority

By late 1781 Governor
He ordered Marion to

and Marion to Postell, January 29, 1781, all in James,
op. cit., App . I. Marion to Nathanael Green e , January 31,
178l~outhern History Association, Vol. XI, p. 193 .
114colonel R. Hampton to John Hampton, April 2,
1781, and Thomas Sumter to Francis Marion, March 28,
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol . III, pp. 44-48.
115Nathanae l Gre ene to Francis Marion , January 16,
1781, Southern History Association, Vol . XI, p. 189 .
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punish any men who wasted, took or destroyed provisions .
Any person doing such was to be prosecuted as a felon. 116
Maintaining the men's morale by defending their
homes and property while away fi ghting was only one-half
the morale problem .

A soldier, militia or regular, must

have confidence in his commander.

The leader is able to

influence his men only if they think he wi ll make decisions
which will provide them the best prospects of survival .
If they survive and return, all is well.

But if they are

captured by the enemy the ir morale will suffer a crippling
blow.

Personal experience has led the present writer to

consider capture as a fate worse than death.

If, however,

the men believe their commander will exhaust every means
avail able to free them, either through military operations
or exchange, they will perform b ette r.
both these requirements .

Mar i on satisfied

He did not attempt military

operations that would place his forces in unnecessary
danger .

This was evident in mid-1782 when he minimized

his operations in an effort to save lives.

He conside red

mos t of the fighting finished and therefore an unnecessary
expense of lives to continue extensive operations . 117

116 J ohn Rutledge to Francis Marion , September 2,
1781 , Gibbes, op. cit ., Vol . III, p. 131.
117 Francis Marion to Major i\licajah Ganey, June 2,
1782, Gibbes, op: cit., Vol. II, p . 183 .
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It was more difficult to regulate prisoners and
their treatment than it was to control military operations.
Marion made every effort however to insure that American
prisoners taken by the British, and vice versa, were
properly treated.

Both the British and Americans made

distinctions between regulars and militia.

Generally

speaking, imprisoned Continentals were treated better
than the militia. 118

There were charges and counter-

charges of ill treatm ent of prisoners of war between
Francis Marion and the British. 119

On one occasion,

after l\Iarion had accused the British of mistreatment
of American prisoners , Colonel Watson, a British officer
in Charleston, said it wou ld be as difficu lt to find a
violation of prisoners by the British as it would be to
find a good act conm1itted by the Americans .1 2 0
It was often difficult and cumbersome to retain
prisoners aft er capture .

To facilitate the handling of

the prisone rs, wide u se was made of paroles .

Interpretation

118colonel Balfour ~ritis~ to Francis Marion,
March 2, 1781 and Nathanae l Greene to Marion, August 10,
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 27 and 125-126.
119captain John Saunders [British Commandant of
Georgetown] to Lieutenant Col onel Irvin, March 6, 1781,
Francis Marion to Colonel Balfour, March 7, 1781, (Marion
accused Balfour of terrible prison conditions for his
men imprisoned by the British), and Francis Marion to
Colonel Watson Q3ritish], March 7, 1781, Gibbes, op . cit.,
Vol. III, pp. 28-31.
120colonel Watson to Francis Marion, March 9, 1781,
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol . III, pp. 33-34.
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of the restraints imposed and what constituted the breaking
of a parole by either side were items that were continuously
qu estioned.

The paroles released a man on his own

recognizance .

Francis Marion often granted paroles to

his prisoners.

But on several occasions he refused to

grant paroles.

For example in October 1780 he refused

to parole a group of Loyalists because he thought that
to give them paroles would be to acknowledge them as
British subjects and that would cause discontent among
his own followers. 121
Marion was often able and will~ng to assist people
in escaping the British but there was normal l y some
hesitation about the status of their parole.

When the

British took Charleston in May 1780, they issued paroles
to the militia forces who surrendered there.

Some of

these paroles required the signers to remain within a
specified distance of Charleston .

Many were located at

Haddrell's Point near Charleston which was under British
control .

In October 1780 Francis Marion said he thought

it would be in his power to re l ease the officers who were
confined at Haddrell's Point.

He wanted to make sure

however that they were clear of their paroles which

12 1 Francis Marion to Horatio Gates, October 4,
1780, Draper Mss, 7VV67-69.
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required them to remain within six miles of the Point .
Marion thought that if they were not free of their
p arol es, the attempt would not be worth hazzarding . 1 22
Other me n were released to their home districts.
However, not long after the paroles were issued the
British required all people on parole to return and take
u p arms for the Crown .

As prisoners of war they should

not have been required to take up arms a g ainst their
former comrades in arms.

Others were stripped of their

property b y the British.

This was considered by many

people to be a violation of the p arol e on the part of
the British and thus the individual was released from
the cont ract .

It was in this latter category that one

of Franci s Marion's officers, Captain John P ostel l,
became involved .
John Postell had been a Lieutenant at the time of
the fall of Charleston .

He was parolled on May 19,

1780 to his plantation in the Parish of St . Marks in
Craven County.

He had pledged that he would not do or

cause anything to be done wh ich might be "prejudicial to
the success of his Majesty's arms, or have intercourse
or hold correspondence with his Majesty's enemies."
He furth er promised to surrender himself to the British
at any time or place so directed by the British .

Soon

122 Francis Marion to Horatio Gates, October 15,
·1780, Draper Mss, 7VV40-42. Marion did not get a timely
answe r from General Gates and the attempt was not made.
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after this parole was signed, he was stripped of all his
property by the British and caused to beg for food for his
family .

He cons idered hims e lf fre e of the parole due to

the British mistreatment. 123

Based on this Marion allowed

Postell to join his brigade in January 1781.
Postell joine d Marion's force as a Captain and
served as Adjutant .

In the latter part of February 1781,

Postell escorted some British prisoners to an exchange
l ocation near Georgetown .

When the British arrived at

the exchange site, Captain Poste ll was detained as a
prisoner .

Marion complained t o Lieut~nant Colonel

Balfour, Commandant of Charleston, and Colonel Watson ,
Commander of the British forces i n the Charleston area .
Marion stated that not only was Postell detained as a
prisone r but Captain Saunders, th e Commandant of Georgetown,
refus ed to release the American prisoners formerly agreed
to. 124

Marion carried on extens ive correspondence with

the British in an effort to obtain Poste ll's release. 125

123 captain John Postell's Parole, dated May 19,
(The parole in
1780, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 36.
Gibbes was a true copy).
124 Francis Marion to Lieutenant Colonel Balfour,
Marion to Colonel Watson, and Marion to Captain Saunders,
all dated March 7, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III,
pp. 29-31.
1 2 5colonel Watson [British] to Francis Marion,
March 9, 1781, Lie utenant Colonel Balfour [British] to
Marion, March 12, 1781, Balfour to Captain Saunders
[British] March 12, 1781, Balfour to Mar i on , March 21,
1781, Saunders to Marion, March 24, 1781, Nathanael Greene
to Francis Marion, May 26, 1781, Gibbes , op . cit., Vol. III,
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He wa s n ot successful in his attempts and it is difficult
to d e t ermine whether Mar ion seriously thou ght he could
succeed in gett ing Postell released.

He s ure ly kn ew

that h e had to make a v i gorous effort .

I f Marion had

not tried to get Postel l released h e would h ave acknowledged
that Pos tel l had broken his parole.
been secondary.

But that wou ld have

Without the effort Marion ' s men wou ld

have lost confide nce in his a bility a nd desire t o protect
them .

The subsequent effect on morale would have sure ly

been fatal to his r ecruitment effort and ability to
influ ence his men . 1 2 6
The last l eadership problem to be discu ssed here
which confronted Marion was probably his most serious a nd
c ontinuous.

This was the dispute of rank , petty jealousy

and mutual dislike b etween two Lieu tenant Colone ls in

pp . 33-13 and 80-81, and Francis Marion to Nathanael
Greene , May 19, 1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library.
Marion even went so far as to r etaliate by t aki ng a
Brit i sh of ficer in the same manner that Postell was
taken. Th e r e is no further mention as to what l\larion did
with Mr . Merritt (the British off i cer taken in retaliation) .
Based on future correspondence between Marion and General
Greene, I believe he was transferred to Greene who returned
him to the British .
126Nathanae l Greene to Francis Marion, August 10,
1781 , Gibbes , op . cit ., Vol . III, pp . 125-126 .
Simms,
op . cit., pp. 262-263. Another case of the n eed for
pro tection of the men under him was the execution of
Colonel I saac Hayne . Although Hayne was from Marion's
Dis tr ic t and worked with him , his case was handled by
Gene ral Greene . ·Hayne became an American martyr . His
execution prompted drastic action b y Greene in the form
o f a cessation of prisoner exchanges and retaliation
a ga inst Brit ish Regular off i cers .
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Marion's District, Peter Horry and Hezekiah Maham.

Both

these men were of immeasurable value to the American
cause in EaGtern South Carolina but their value was
d iminished due to their inability to get along together .
Ironically, their problem was not created by Marion but
b y General Greene.

Their animosity began through

competition between the two men in recruitment of separate
cavalry units at the same time, therefore competing for
men, money and equipment .
Genera l Greene had desired more cavalry in the
Southern Theater and encouraged Governor Rutledge to
raise these two cavalry units.

Greene's use of these

cavalry units was to be similar to his u se of Colonel
Henr y Lee .

He allowed Maham and Horry to operate

independently answering only to him u nless attached
to another unit .

Though this independence worked well

in itially, the system deteriorated as the war edged to
a close .

Gre ene b egan to change his tactics from

predominan tly cavalry oriented to infantry oriented
forces but Maham and Horry were reluctant to accept a
change in their independent status.

As a result these

two mobile units rebelled at any orders other than those
of General Greene .1 27

127 Nathanael Greene to Franc is Marion, January 17,
1782, Greene Papers, Clements Library.
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Shor tly after they had begun recruitment of their
Continental cavalry, Colonels Horry and Maham argued as
to whom was the ranking officer in Marion's brigade .
Maham contende d in July 1781 that he outranked Horry
becau se of Horry ' s service as a supernumerary officer
and not in the regular establishment but Greene settled
the rank dispute in favor of Horry. 128

The rank di spute

came up a ga in in 1782 when l\Iarion went to the General
Assembly meeting at Jacksonborou g h as a Senator.

On

Marion ' s departure for the assembly, he appointed Colonel
Horry to command in his absence . 129

l\Iaham refused to

s erve under Horry contending that he outranked Horry.
Greene again ruled in favor of Horry. 130

Horry advised

Maham of this d etermination but Maham refused to accept
the ruling from anyone except General Greene . 1 3 l

12 8 Nathanael Greene to P eter Horry , July 30, 1781,
Greene Papers, Clements Library and Horry to Greene,
August 6, 1781, Frederick R. Kirkland, op. cit . , Vol. II,
p. 80.
129Francis Marion to Peter Horry, January 12, 1782,
Gibbes, op . cit ., Vol III, pp. 228-229 .
130Nathanael Greene to Francis hlarion, January 17,
1782, Gre ene Papers, Clements Library .
1 31 Francis Marion to Peter Horry, January 18, 1782;
Hezekiah Maham to Horry , January 20, 1782, Nathanael Greene
to Horry, February 1 and 1 4, 1782, Gibbes, op. cit ., Vol. III,
p p . 231-232, 238-239, 247-248 and 251-253, and Greene to
Mar i on, January 28, 1782, Southern History Association ,
Vol. XI, pp. 203-204.
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The dispute over rank and Maham's refusal to work
directly with or for Peter Horry were major contributing
causes to a defeat for Mar i on's brigade while Mar ion was
at the assembly.

Horry had tried to get Col onel Maham

to establish a security post but Maham refused to take
orders from Horry . 13 2
blameles s .

But Horry was not a ltogether

Marion had advised Horry to keep out small

scouting parties of horse as security measu res.
of these measures were neg l ected by Horry.

Many

As a result ,

about seven hundred of the British attacked Marion's
b rigade on February 25 , 1782 at Tidyman's Plantation .
Marion's force was routed and might have been completely
wiped out had the enemy pursued them . 133
With the depletion of the cavalry units of Maham
and Horry as a result of this action, Marion recommended
t o Governor Mathews the consolidation of the two corps .
Mathews and General Greene agreed to the plan and authorized
Marion to carry out the necessary arrangements to the best

13 2peter Horry to Hezekiah Maham , January 19,
1782, Gibbes , 2£, cit . , Vol . III, pp . 238-239.
133G . W. Greene, op. cit., Vol. II I, pp . 440-442
and Kirkland, op . cit., pp. 80-81. Mar:i,on arrived too
l ate to preventthe rout and the report of casualties
fluctuat ed too much to be accepted as fact ual.
The
British claimed that the American casualties were two
hundred, maybe three hundred , while the Americans
report ed that there wer e no more than sixteen killed,
wounde d and missing as a result of Colonel Thompson's
attack .
Extract of a letter from South Carolina ,
March 13, 1782, Maryland Gazette , May 9, 1782 .
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interests of the service. 134

General Greene wrote Marion

concerning the appoin tment of the commanding officer of
the proposed consolidated cavalry.

He stated he was

informed that Colonel Maham was the best cavalry officer
and that most of the men that would b e in the corps were
from Maham's regiment.

He further commented on Marion's

earlier effort to obtain the position of Colonel Hende rson
for Colone l Horry .

Marion tried to appease Horry by

getting Greene and Mathews to appoint Horry as the
replacement for Colone l Henderson who had bee n made a
brig adier in the state militia .

This was imposs ibl e

because Henderson had accepted the brigadier's commiss ion
only if he could retain his Continental Colonel's rank
and the Governor did not intend to promote any more
brigadiers in the state. 1 3 5
Marion agreed with Greene's comments with regard
to Maham's cavalry superiority . 136

Based on Marion's

agreement, Greene wrote Horry t e lling him that Marion
recommended Maham over him as the commander of the
consolidated corps.

Greene was careful to qualify his

134Governor Mathews to Francis Marion , March 12,
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol . III, pp. 270-271 .
~ 35Na thanae l Greene to Francis Marion , March 19 ,
1782, Southern History Association, Vol. XI, pp . 205-206.
136Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, March 27,
1782, Southern History Association , Vol. XI, pp. 206-207
and Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, p. 279.
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comments and mentioned Marion's effort to get Horry
appointed in the position of Colonel Henderson . 137
Colonel Horry was mad and hurt that Maham received the
command and he had been kicke d out of the service. 1 3 8
As a resu l t of this Marion altered his recommendation.
I n h i s effort to appease Horry and prov ide for the defens e
of Georgetown , Marion recommended that Horry's corps be
dismou nted .

They would then be assi gne d to serve as

i nfantry for the defense of Georgetown . 139

He als o

recommended that Maham's corps be expanded to one hundred
and twenty men .

Mathews and Greene were confused and

considere d it a new plan.

Mathews objected to the

recruitme nt for hlaham's corps b ecau se the terms of service
would expire in four months and considered this not worth
the expense. 140

Green e and Mathews h ad now become disen -

137 Nathanael Greene to P eter Horry , two letters
both date d March 29, 1782, Gibbes , op . cit., Vol. III,
pp . 280-283.
138peter Horr y to Francis Marion , and Horry to
Nathanael Greene, April 1, 1782, Gibbes, op . cit . ,
Vol . I II, pp . 285-287. Horry was hurt that Marion had
ended his career and he held Marion r espons ible.
13.9 Francis Marion to Peter Horry, March 31, 1782 ,
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. I II, pp. 284-285.
140 John Mathews to Francis Marion, April 1, 1782,
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. II, p. 149 and I saac Hu ger to
Thomas Sumte~June 6, 1781, Draper Mss, 7VV317 . The
exact number of Maham's Corps after the battle with
Thompson is not known but it is doubtful that it was
over fifty in number b ecause his streng th in June 1781
was only fifty men and that had probably decreased by
_1782, assuming the trend was the same for his corps as
for othe r units.
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chanted with the problems of consolidation.

Greene told

Marion to do the best he could in a way most pleasing to
t he officers . 141

Finally, Horry's corps was dismounted

and d esignated to def end Georgetown and vicinity.

Maham

r emained at the head of his cavalry as before without
the additional troops.
These we re not all the leadership problems wh ich
confronted Marion but they are indicative of the responsi bilities he had to contend with.
for the "Swamp Fox."
commanders.

Everything was not easy

He was no dif ferent from other

He had to prove himself to his subordinates

time and again or risk the loss of their loyalty and
support .

Marion's ability and foresi g ht in dealin g with

his leader ship problems exhibited his mil itary knowledge .
He was aware that althou g h the mission was of primary
importance, the welfare of the men under him was a nec essary
secondary consideration which could not be overlooked.
Without good men with good morale t h e mission could not
be accomplished and maintenance of morale is the r esponsib ility of the commander, it cannot be delegated.

141Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion , April 10,
1782, Gibbes , op . cit . , Vol . II, p . 159.

CHAPTER I V
THE GUERRILLA LOGISTICIAN
The military district of Eastern South Carolina
which Francis Marion commande d was as important log istically as it was militarily.

The supplies which came

from Marion's district consisted mainly of imports through
the port of Georgetown.

The port facility provided an

additional lifeline for the Southern Army .

Prior to the

evacuation of George town by the British the primary
American logistical support had been obtained by means
of overland transport from the North, limited local
supplies, and captured British provisions .

Such a

log istic al dependence reflects the tenuous nature of
military and supp ly operations in the South.

Biographies

of Francis Marion cast him in almost every role except
that of logistician.
primary importance.

Ironically, that was probably his
He cannot be credited with taking

Georgetown or single-hande dly defendin g i t .

The British

evacuation of Georgetown was caused more by the reduction
of the other British posts in South Carolina , most notably
Camden, the overall pressure of the Americans in the
Southern Theater and Cornwallis' movement from Wilmington
to Virginia.
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Georgetown was the hub of a large river system near
which large quantities of rice were grown .

Control of

Georgetown, whether intended br not, was the event which
changed Marion's method of operations.

His primary missions

early in his career had been to maintain the morale of
the local populace, provide intelligence and harass the
British supply lines .

By mid-1781, wi th the wi thdrawal

of most of the British forces i nto and near Charleston,
the logistical importance of Marion's area, particularly
the port of Georgetown, came to the attention of the l eaders
in the Southern Theater.

This attention transforme d riiarion

into a logistician , as much by necessity as by personal
desire .
Francis Marion had wanted to take Georgetown from
the British withi n 58 days of hi s assumption of command .
His force was never very large until 1781.

He had only

seventy men operating with him when he made his first
attack on Georgetown on October 8, 1780.

Marion and his

men had made a sixty mile forced march to Georgetown
which r equired only a day and a half.

Upon his arrival

h e had a brief skirmish with some Loyalists under Major
Micajah Ganey.

The Loyalists quickly retreated into the

redoubt of the town.

Marion then asked the defenders,

which consisted of about seventy Loyalists, to surrender.
With their refusal he made an effort to draw them out .
This maneuver was u nsuccessful and he and his men were
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forced to retreat when he received intelligence of the
approach of a larger British force.

Before he departed

his force paraded through the town near the redoubt and
took off six horses and some of the baggage of the Loyalists
in the defensive works . 1 4 2
The purpose of this first effort against Georgetown
is unclear.

It is doubtful that Marion would or cou ld

have tried to defend Georgetown had h e been successful .
With a force of only seventy men, and in the absence of
General Gates' Southern Army, such a move would have
been suicidal . 143

More than likel y he was using the

attack to boost the morale of the people in Georgetown
and his own force .

This attempt was s urely considered

a victory, a definite necessity at this time of sagging
American morale in the South.

Marion may h ave apprec iate d

the i mportan ce of Georgetown lo g istically at this time
but it was surely a secondary consideration.
Marion's situation did not change much prior to
his second attempt to take Georgetown.

In November 1780,

the British still maintai ne d military superiority throughout

1 42Francis Marion to Horat io Gates, October 15,
1780, Draper hlss , 7VV40 - 42 (copied from New-York Historical
Society by Lyman C. Draper) . Marion had asked Gates
permission to attack as ear l y as October 8 , 1780 .
143 At this t i me Gates was in North Carolina trying
to regroup his Southern Army after his defeat at Camden
and could not g ive Marion ass i stance .

64

most of South Carolina.

Marion's force r emained small .

In early November Marion was stationed on the Santee
River in an effort to intercept British supply boats.
He was not very successful in this venture .

At that

time h e received in telligence that George town was
defended by only fifty invalids .

With this information

he decided to try to take the town again.

Unluckily,

on the night before he arrived, two hundred Loyalists
marched into Geol~ge town .
skirmished briefly.

The Loyalists came out and

In the action the Loyalists lost

three men killed and t welve as prisoners , th e r est
retreat ed into the redoubt.

Marion was unable to attempt

an attack on the garrison becau se he had only four
rounds of ammun ition per man.

The loss for :M arion ' s

force was two men killed, one of whom was Lieutenant
Gabriel l\larion (nephew of Francis), and three wounded. 144
The situation in Marion ' s dis tr ict continued to
favor the British in December 1780 and earl y Janu ary 1781 .
The British superiority did not however de ter Marion's
desire to attack Georgetown .

All Marion's let ters during

the period alluded to the enemy strength in and around
Georgetown .

On December 6, 1780 he asked General Gates

for Continental reinforcements to make his efforts more
effective.

When Marion wrote this letter h e did not know

14 4Francis Marion to Horat io Gates, November 21,
1780, Draper Mss, 7VV72-73.
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that Gates had been replaced by General Nathanael Greene
on December 4, 1780.

Although Marion's letter , which

ended up in Greene's possession, did not state that he
intended to use the requested forces against Georgetown,
it was apparent that this was his personal desire. 145
Gene ral Greene 's initial action s upon assumption
of command were directed at providin g for his forces and
becoming acquainted with his commanders .

He also moved

his headquarters southeast to the vicinity of Cheraw ,
South Carolina, about 95 miles northwest of Georgetown .
These actions refl ected a d es ire on Greene's part to
resume the American effort in the Southern Thea ter .
His intentions were furth er evidenced when h e sent
Colon e l Henry Lee to j o in Marion for the purpose of
attacking Georgetown.1 46

This mission was undertaken on

January 25, 1781 and fail ed .
he said became los t . 1 4 7

Lee blamed the guides who

Marion attributed the failure

to a lack of artillery support.

In any event, Georgetown

remained in British ha nds after this t hird attempt. 1 4 8

145Francis Marion to Horatio Ga tes , December 6,
1780, Marion to Nathanael Greene, December 22, 1780 and
January 9, 1781, Gree n e Papers, Clements Library .
146Nathanael Gre ene to Francis Marion , January 23,
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library.
147 Henry Lee to Nathanael Gre ene , January 25, 1781,
Greene Papers , Clements Library .
148 Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, January 27,
_1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library.
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The future logistical importance of Georgetown was
evide n t l y not apparent to Greene, Marion or anyone else
at this time.

Gre ene was more interested in ini tiat i ng

operations a gains t the British and surely did not want
to tie d own any forces in a def ensive postu re .

Marion

did not want to get i nvolved in the lo g istical business
bu t rather wanted to demonstrate to the people in his
district that positive action was being taken in their
behalf.

Had Mar i on and Lee been successfu l against

Georgetown i t i s certain they could not have occupied
o r utili zed the town logistically at this time due to
Brit ish strength .

Greene had moved hi s headquarters

to Cheraw by th i s time bu t Cornwallis' forces caused
Greene to begin a withdrawal north in February 1781 .
The wi t h drawal ended with the Battle of Guilford Court
Hou se , near Greensboro, North Carolina .

After this

fi g ht Cornwallis went to Wilmington and Greene return e d
to South Carolina in the vicin i ty of Camden , about 95
mil es west northwest of Georgetown .
In Marc h of 1781 the Br itish began taking actions
which indicated they had doubts about the safety of
Georgetown .

They closed the port to al l sh ips except

those operating to and from Charl eston .

The British

apparently desired to maintain on l y the minimum necessary
s upplies i n the town.

They forbid unloading any vessel
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without approval from Charleston.149

Soon after this

dec ision by the British, the American forces began reducing
the British posts between Charleston and Camden, thus
negating the usefulness of Georgetown .
Marion and Lee were again united in April 1781
to take Fort Watson .

In May they also successfully l aid

siege to Fort Motte.

Up to this time Marion had bee n too

busy to attack Georgetown and had no thoughts about it
logistically .

B~t immediately after the capitulation of

Fort Motte he became anxious a ga in.

On May 19, 1781 he

b egan correspondence with Gen eral Greene in an effort to
obtain permission to attack Georgetown .

He needed Greene's

approval because at the time he was attached to General
Thomas Sumter for operations south of Georgetown.

Marion's

basis for reque s tin g approval was the fact that the British
garrison at Georgetown numbere d onl y eighty British soldiers .
He also be lieved that the reduction of George town would
cause the Loyalists around the Little Pedee River and
Waccamaw River to ceas e actions against him.

The Loyalists

in the area under Major Ganey had proved to be particularly
troublesome to Marion's operations in the district . 150
It is interesting to note that Marion did not us e the

149 colonel Nesbit Balfour [Commandant of Charlestoaj
to Colonel Cassels [Commandan t of George town], March 13,
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 37.
15 °Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, May 19 and
20, 1781, Greene Papers , Clements Library.
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logistical capability of Georgetown as an argument to
attack .

This causes one to believe that his desire to

take Georgetown was still oriented more toward the
improvement of distri ct morale than toward logistical
support.
Green e qualified his approval for Marion to attack
Georgetown.

He authorized the effort if the enemy was

not making preparations to move in support of Ninety Six
or Augus ta which Greene was in the process of besieging.
He further stated that Marion mu st receive General Sumter's
assurance that with Marion's departure to Georgetown,
Sumter would not be too exposed to the British. 151
General Sumter was also equivocal about approval for
Marion to go against George town.

Marion went anyway. 152

It is readily apparent that Greene did not appreciate the
logistical value of George town or know the magnitude of
supplies the British had stored there.

In his let ter

to Marion dated May 26, 1781, Gre ene said he conside red
Georgetown to be an "inferior object. 11 153

Marion went

to Georgetown anyway, arriving on May 28, 1781.

He

1 ~ 1 Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, May 26, 1781,
Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. III, pp. 80-81 and Greene to Thomas
Sumter, May 26, 1781, Charleston Yearbook of 1899, App. A,
p. 103, and Draper Mss , 7VV305-307.
152 Thomas Sumter to Nathanael Greene, June 7, 1781,
Draper Mss, 7VV320-322.
1 ~3.Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, May 26, 1781,
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 80-81.
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immediatel y opened s iege entren chments.

The Britis h

however evacuated the post during the evening and boarded
ships.

The ships moved only a short distance away from

the port. 154

Marion wrote Greene that h e was in the

process of leveling the British defenses and had found
a l arge quantity of salt for the use of the Southern
Army.

He would have left Georgetown sooner and returned

to his position south of the Santee River but h e was
appre hensive that the British would return to Georgetown
and de stroy all the provisions h e h ad captured .

At this

time he requested some Continental regulars to assist
him in guarding the provisions against British reprisal .
He considered h i s present force to be insufficient to
prevent great destruction if the Britis h made such an
attempt.

Gre ene was unable to send the requ ested

assistance at this t~me .1 55
In any other situation Greene would probably have
apprec i ated the logistical importance of Georgetown.

But

154 Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, May 29,
178 1, Southern History Association, Vol. XI, pp. 197-198.
1 55Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, June 5, 1781,
Green e Papers, Clements Library . Greene was beseiging
Ninety Six and feared that the British would relieve the
garrison there . His fears were realized when Lord Rawdon
[Britisti] marched to the assistance of Ninety Six . Greene
was not happy beca u se he had wanted to fight the British
in a decisive battle . But because Marion was in Georgetown
and Pickens was in the back country, Greene was un a ble to
mass his forces against Rawdon.
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a t this time he had the necessary but not excessive
suppl i es.

He had written Genera l George Washington i n

December 17 30 and identified his lack of complete logistical
support . 1 56

It was apparent that as a former Quartermaster

General of the Continental Army that he appreciated the
importance of supplies to an army .

But at this time

Greene was in Southern South Carolina, Ninety S i x, and
Georgetown was def i nitely not as important as it wou l d
b ecome later when he moved back to the vicinity of the
High Hil l s of Santee River.

Marion himself began to

appreciate the logistical importance of Georgetown in
Ju ne 1 781 and he tried to convince Greene.

He wrote

Greene that Georgetown was "the only place where we may
draw an [siaj quantity of subsistence for the Army . ,,15 7
However Greene still considered the acquisi tion of
Georgetown as important only to Marion's own district
and not to the entire Southern Army .1 58
I t was not until December 1781 that General Greene
began to use Georgetown extensivel y as a logistical base .
His usage of Georgetown for supplies and appreciation
of its logistical importance continued to grow in

156Nathanael Greene to George Washington , December 28,
1780 , George Washington Papers, op. cit . , Reel 73.
1 57 Francis Marion to Nathanae l Greene, J u ne 5 , 1 781 ,
Greene Papers, Clements Library .
1 58 Nathanael Gree ne to Francis Marion, June 10, 1781,
James , op . cit . , App . 1 .
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1782. 159

Greene's fear that the British might try to

return to Georgetown and take or destroy his supply base
there caused him to caution Marion and the people of
Georgetown about its defense and the safety of the
supplies . 160

In May 1782 General Greene appointed Samuel

Dwight as Commissary of issues and i'\lr . White as Commissary
of purchases for Georgetown . 1 61

His concern for the

safety of the · supplies at Georgetown continued into the
end of July .

At that time he again cautioned Marion and

told him to activate all the militia necessary to protect
the port.

Marion was further directe4 to move the supplies

up the rivers away from Georgetown. 162

The thought and

fear of losing Georgetown, particularly the supplies,
caused Greene great concern . 163
Governor Rutledge had become interested in the
supplies and trade. of Georgetown as early as October 24,

159Nathanael Greene to Peter Horry, December 14,
1781, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. III, pp . 222-223 and Greene
to Francis i'\larion, January 3, 1782, Southern History
Associati on, Vol. XI, p . 201.
160Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, March 1,
1782, Southern History Association, Vol . XI, pp . 204-205.
161Francis Marion to Peter Horry, May 24, 1782,
Gibbes , op . cit. , Vol. II, pp. 179-180.
162Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, July 27,
1782, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. II, p. 202.
163Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion , July 30,
1782, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol . II, pp. 203-204.
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1781 . 164

Governor Rutledge' s successor as Governor ,

John Mathews , continued to b e interested in Georgetown ,
especially the encouragement of trade there.

Mathews

even went so far as to commission George He riot t , a
merchant, to make a survey of t he provisions available
around Geor getown .

His main in terest in the supplies

there was caused by the fact that the southern part of
South Carolina had been str i pped bare due to the operations
of Green e and the British Commande r, Lord Rawdon, around
Ninety Six and Augu sta .16 5

By April 1782 Marion did not

have to worry about in terest in Georgetown by the Governor
and Command ing Ge n e ral.

He now had more h e lp and advice

than he could possibly want .
The acquisition of Georgetown enlarged Francis
Marion's du t i es consider ab ly.

He was forced by circum-

stances to spend more time with l ogistical , admin i st rative
and d efensive matters .
military operations .

Th is l ed t o a decrease in his
He was n ow burdene d with responsi-

bilities similar t o those which the British had previously.
If i t were necessary to determin e the point in t i me that
Francis Marion ' s tactics changed from guerrilla to
conve n tion a l, it would be May 28, 1781, the date the

164John Rutledge to Francis Marion, October 24 ,
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 196 -198 .
165 John Mathews to Francis Marion, April 1 5,
1782, Gibbes , £E · cit., Vol . II. pp. 1 64-165 .
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British evacuated and Mar ion occupied Georgetown .

His

actions then changed from covert to overt and he had to
appoint a garr ison commander, prepare his defe nses and
defend the town and supplies against the British.
Gen eral Marion, after leveling the British defensive
works in Georgetown, l eft command of Georgetown in the
hands of local mili t ia leaders.

He did provide guidance

to the mili tia commanders in the area through Lieutenan t
Colonel Hugh Horry, the commander of most of the militia
units around Georgetown.

Marion closely guarded his

control of the port and when General Thomas Sumter sent
an officer , Captain W. K. Davis, to Georgetown he cautioned
Sumter that this move might interfere wi th hi s command
there.166

Marion la ter transferred the responsibility of

command of George town and vicinity to Co lonel Peter Horry.
This change occurred in March 1782 when Marion converted
Peter Harry' s cavalry to infantry.

The change was

necessitated by the increased import ance of Georg etown
logistically and Marion's desire to retain command there
by appointin g an officer who wou ld outrank Sumter's

Captain.

At that time Marion gave Horry explicit

direction s for the control of Georgetown .

Particu lar

attention was to be paid to the defense of trade and

166 Francis Marion to Thomas Sumter, July 26,
1781, Draper Mss , 7VV436.
Hug h Horr y was the broth er of
Peter Horry and had preceded Marion as commander of the
Williamsburg Militia.
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all vessels arriving at the port .

Horry was to regulate

trade and contro l all other mat ters for the good of the
service . 1 67

Marion similarly designated an assistant

commandan t .

This appointment allowe d Horry to move

around the countryside and defend the local crops and
cattle. 168
When he first took Georgetown in May 1781, he had
destroy ed the British d efens ive works, not r ealizing the
future importanc~ of the port .

After the lo g istical

importance became apparent, there were insufficient
funds for construction, but a d efens iv e plan was necessary .
The measures he employed were passive moving the supplies
up the river as suggested by Gene ral Greene ,

Greene and

Marion thought Georgetown would b e safe i f the supplies
were inaccess ible.169

He employed a mobile rather than

a position type defens e .

Even thou gh he thought he would

b e able to defend Georgetown and the surrounding are as
against the Brit i sh foraging parties with a mobile force,
h e was very pessimistic wit h r egard to defense of supp l ies

1 67 Francis Marion to Peter Horry, March 7 and 31,
1781, Gibbes, op . ci t . , Vol. III, pp. 264 and 284-285 .
168Francis Marion to Peter Horry, April 18, 1782,
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. II, pp . 166-167. The assistant
Commandant was Colone l Moultrie, one of Marion's Regimental
Commanders who was wa iting for his Regiment to report
for duty .
. __16_9Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, March 1,
1782, Southe rn History Association, Vol . XI, pp . 204-205.
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south of the Santee River.170

He viewed Georgetown's

greatest threats as being by water from Charleston and
on land from the Loyalists along the Pedee River under
Major Micajah Ganey.1 7 1
On February 6, 1782 the leg islature passed an act
entitled "An Act for the better Defense and Security of
this Sta te during the Recess of the General Assembly."
Section 3 of the act authorized the erection or repair
of garrison forts and fort ifications for the better
defense of the state . 172

An engineer officer, Colon e l

Christian Senf, was sent to discuss building such defenses
for Geor getown .

Colonel Senf obtained the supervisors

and labor for the project. 173

Marion sent additional

artillerymen to Georgetown and orde red militia reinforcements.174

Based on a suggestion by Pet er Horry in

March 1782, Mar ion provided guidance for the outfitting

170 Francis Marion to Thomas Sumter, June 6, 1781,
Draper Mss , 7VV315-3 16 , Marion to Nathanael Gree ne,
August 13, 1781, and William Harden to Marion, Aug ust 15,
1781, Greene Papers, Cleme nts Library.
171Francis Marion to Peter Horry, May 25, 1782,
Gibbes , op. cit . , Vol. II, pp . 180-181 .
_172General Assembly of the State of South Carolina,
1782, op. cit .
1 73 John Mathews, to Francis Marion , March 4, 1782,
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, p. 263.
17 4Francis Marion to P eter Horry, March 7, 1782,
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, p . 264.
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of a s chooner for defensive purposes .175

This vessel was

to be posit ioned at the confluence of the Waccamaw, Pe d ee
and Sampit Uivers . 17 6

However the schooner was not placed

on station un t il October . 177
The new defensive posture did not change Marion's
plan to move up r i ver as many supplies as p ossible .
Marion personally ou t lined the fortifications for a d e pot
at Black Min g o, about twenty miles northwest of Georgetown,
for the storage of supplies which were moved .178

Greene

did not make l\Iarion's job of improving defenses any
easier.

During the middle of 1782 when Marion was trying

to build the fort ifi cations , Gen e r a l Greene was continually
calling out the militia for one last large engagement
against th e British . 179

Marion also called up his militia

at the slig htest indication that the British or Loyalists

175 Francis Marion to Peter Horry , March 12 , 1782,
Gibbes, op . c i t . , Vol . III. p . 270.
176Francis Marion to Peter Horry, May 25, 1782,
Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol . II, pp . 180-181 .
177 John Mathews to Francis Mar i o n, Septemb er 18,
1782, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol . II, p . 228.
178 Francis l\Iarion to Peter Horry, March 13, 1782,
Gibb es , op . cit ., Vol. III, pp . 271-272.
The d e pot was
to b e situated so that it could control the river by musket
shot.
I t was to be round with a high abbat i s . A blockhouse seventeen feet square was to be erected in t h e center
of the fort at a h eight to overlook the parapet .
It was
similar to an in ternal Maham tower . There were to be no
gates and portable ladders were to be use d so they could
be taken in every ni g ht.
179 Nathanae l Gre ene to Francis Marion, April 28,
1782, Gibbes , op . cit ., Vol. II, pp . 171-172.
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might attack Georgetown .

Marion solved this flexible

callup system by directing Horry to call in two companies
of militia around Georgetown whenever the main force was
operating away from the area with Greene. 180
Even these extensive preparations did not completely
deter the British .

General Greene issued a warning to

Marion on June 9, 1782 that the British were preparing
three galleys for the destruction of stores in Georgetown. 181
Marion relayed t~e warning to Horry . 182

Greene believed

the situation was becoming more serious on July 27, 1782
and he wrote Marion stating that the British, with seven
hundred men, were embarking for Georgetown and were
expected to arrive within twenty four hours .

Greene was

worried lest the supp lies in Georgetown, which he termed
"immense," would fall into British hands .

According to

Greene the only defense wou l d be to remove all the supplies
from Georgetown . 183

Greene ' s l etter did not arrive until

Ju 1 y 3 0 , 178 0 .

180Francis Marion to Peter Horry, March 8 and May 21
and 24, 1782, Gibbes, op . cit ., Vol. II, pp . 177-180 and
Vol. III, pp . 266- 267.- - lSlNathanael Greene to Francis Marion, June 9, 1782,
Gibbes , op . cit., Vol. II, p. 187 .
l8 2 Francis Marion to Peter Horry , June 9 and 15,
1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 187- 188 and 191 .
183 Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion , July 27,
1782, Gibbes, op. cit. , Vol . II, p. 202.
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Greene and Governor Mathews were v ery p ess imist i c
about any h ope of d efending Georgetown with this d e lay. 184
The Governor felt that Georgetown would inevi tab l y fall
and that such an event would be a dreadful stroke to the
American side. 185
British advanc e .

Marion r eac h e d Georgetown before the
The military stores in Georgetown had

already been moved to Black Mingo by Mario n's men.

The

British did not make an attempt on Georgetown i tse l f ,
prefe rring to po?ition themselves on the south branch of
the Santee River and carry off rice , of which t h ere were
about 800 barrels of finished rice on t hat branch.

The

British position on a narrow neck of land made it
impract i cable for Marion to annoy them .

Marion ' s men

had moved the stores of George town but not those alon g
the south branch of the Santee .

Marion viewed the loss

of ric e as ser ious but there was nothing he could do
about it . 186

Though the Br i tish threatened more raids

of this type they never carried them out around George town. 187

18 4Nathanae l Greene t o Francis Mar ion, July 30,
1782, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 203-204.
l8 5 John Mathews to Francis Marion, July 30, 1782 ,
Gibbes , op. cit . , Vol. II, p. 203.
186 Francis Marion to Nat hanae l Greene, Au gust 1,
1782, Gre ene Papers, Clements Library.
187Ge neral Alexander Les lie to Nathanael Gree n e ,
August 13, 1782, Mary l and Gazette, October 17, 1782.
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The defensive problems were only incide n tal to
Marion's responsibili ty of opera ting the port f acility .
He had to encourage trade wh ile regulating the prices .
Marion's efforts in contro lling trade inc luded establishment of prices and approval of exchanges o f goods .
Trade regulation was further complicated a nd confused b y
the e x cessive number of commissaries from various mi litary
unit s all congregated in Georgetown .

In t i me , General

Greene, General Sumter and General Marion al l h ad at
l east one supply r e presentat ive in Georgetown seeking
supplies for their own force. 1 8 8
Trade in Georgetown was insignifican t until September
1781.

But the trade was not simply a matte r of buying

and selling --it was really trading.

Payment for goods

purchased varied with the season and mark etability of the
produc ts .

Some de alers wou ld accept almost anything in

payme n t for the ir merchandi se.

Captain Putnam was one of

these accepting indigo , rice, Negroes and bills on France
in payment for his goods, which cons i sted of almost every
i tem imag inable from liquor to blankets . 189

Other merchants

were more selective in their r equirements for payment.

188 Francis Mar ion to Peter Horry, May 24, 1782 ,
Gib bes, op . cit. , Vol. I I, pp . 17 9 - 180 and Will iam Swinton
to Mario~ October 9, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III,
pp. 183-184 . Greene had two repres entat ives there .
189william Swinton to Francis Mar ion, October 9,
1781, Gibbes, op . cit . , Vo l . I II, pp. 1 8 3-184.
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During one season they would accept only indi go , valued
at one pound indigo equal to thr ee pounds sterling, and
one month later would accept only rice .

Their demands

depended on the market at the other end of their trade
route.190

There were two things however on which all

me rchant s agreed, they must b e paid and they must receive
a profit or they would not return and Marion made every
effort to ensure both.191
In his efforts to increase trade and at the same
time provide the necessary military supplies, Marion
established himse lf as the approving authority on the
prices for all necessities throug h his own commissary,
William Swinton. 192

Import items considered as military

necessities by hlarion cons i sted of salt, s u gar, coffee ,
tea and medicines.

As an example, he established the

price of salt at four doll ars per bushel.

A policy of

leniency of price was a llowe d with luxury items which
were to be sold at any price the seller pleased.193
Marion's regulation of trade lasted only until Governor

190 Peter Horry to Francis Marion , March 11 and
June 29, 178 2 , Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 268-270
and Vol. II, p. 196.
191Francis Marion to Peter Horry, April 19 and
July 4, 1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 169 and 196.
l9 2 William Swin ton to Francis Marion , October 9,
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 183-184.
193 Franc is Mar ion to P eter Horry, March 7 and 12,
1782, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 264-270.
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Mathews came to power .

He ordered Marion to cease his

practice of regulating trade because he considered such
practices to be stumbling blocks to increased trade in
Georgetown which would hurt the army and state. 1 94
Mathews' directive was poorly timed and stimulated
inflation.

It was at this time that every large military

unit had its own commissary in Georgetown which created
more competition among buyers than among sellers.1 9 5
However a more pressing and constant problem
existed in the threat of American Privateers.

If vessels

could not enter the port with their supplies there would
be no trade to regulate.

No protection could be given

to the merchants at sea but Marion did all in his power
to protect them once they arrived at the port.

He also

gave merchants passes but they were normally disregarded
by the privateers .

The privateers stopped the trading

vessels at the entrance to Georgetown and virtuall y
eliminated all trade . 1 96

These privateers were so

brazen that they even sailed up the rivers and plundered

l94John Mathews to Francis Marion, May 1, 1782,
Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. II,_ pp. 172-173.
19 ~Francis Marion to Peter Horry, May 24, 1782,
Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. II, pp. 179-180.
196 Peter Horry to Francis Marion, March 11, 1782,
Gibbes, op. cit ., Vol. III, pp. 268-270.
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plantations near the river banks.

They took Negroes and

other property under the pretense ttat the owners were
Loyalists.

Many times the owners were friendly to America

and, in any event, all Loyalist propert y reverted to
state prope rty.

Governor Rutledge directed Marion to halt

this notorious practice by stopping and inventorying the
cargo of all boats on the rivers .

These boats we r e to

be held until Rutledge made a dete rmination for their
di sposition or release . 19 7
Most of the privateers were under commissions from
either the Continental Cong r ess or some other s tate
governme nt.

The privateers wou ld hal t a vessel on the

bas is or under the pretense that it was carrying contraband
goods .

After capture the privateers would petition a

"Judge of the Admiralty" to h a ve the case l egally tri e d.
The d ec ision normally ended in favor of the privateers. 19 8
These excesses by privateers were not isolated in South
Carolina,and as a result, the Contine ntal Congress
eventually took action against unlimited privateer in g
by enacting a new law on July 10, 1782.

The old law

authorized any United States vessel to capture any enemy

197 John Rutledge to Francis Mari on, October 12,
1781, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol. III, pp. 188-189.
198 John Mathews to Francis Marion, April 15, 1782
and Marion to Horry, April 22, 1782, Gibbes , op. cit.,
Vol. II, pp. 164-165 a nd 169-170 .
--
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vessel commissioned as man of war or privateer and retain
the entire load of property.

The new law directed that

if the vessel capturing was smaller than that captured,
the capturing vessel could keep the entire property
captured .

If , however, the capturing vessel was larger

than the one captured, the capturing ship could retain
one-half the cargo and the American Government would
receive the other half . 199

Marion later sought to

discour age unlimited privateer actions by using the
Georgetown schooner to protect merchants in and around
Georgetown . 200
These preventive measures were successful and trade
increased greatly by October 1782.

Colonel R. Lushington,

who replaced Colonel Peter Horry as commandant of
Georgetown in July 1782, c l aimed in October that he had
personal l y obtained $30,000 worth of supplies for the
Army during his tour at Georgetown.

This reflects only

one man's efforts for a three month period and the
logistical significance of a port which General Greene
had termed as an "inferior object" in 1781. 2 0l

199J~urn.a ls of the · Continen·t -al· Congress, 177 4-1789
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1914), Vol. XXI I,
pp. 379-380.
200 captain John .Milligan to Francis Marion, October 27
and 31, 1782, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. II, pp. 240 and 244.
201 colonel R. Lushington .to · Francis Marion,
October 31, 1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 245.
It is difficult to determine the exact date Col. Lushington
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Of course privateers were n ot the only threat to
trade and all the Army's supplies did not come through
Georgetown.

Marion and his men still had to protect

the suppli es throughout the countryside against the
British.

The protect ion of s upplies already in hand

is an assumed mission for any mili tary commander and
was nothing n ew for Marion.

By protecting the supplies

on hand, Marion denied supplies to the British.

He was

extremely active in his operations to harass and deny
log istical support from the very beginning of his guerrilla
movements.

Marion understood the importance of the denial

mission and readily received and executed General Greene's
orders in that regard. 2 02
All item~ were important to Marion when harassing
enemy supply lines but there were some items which were
more importan t from the standpoint of denial operations .
The supplies of primary importance in Marion's district
were salt, rice, cattle and horses.

A considerable

quantity of salt was produced along the Waccamaw River.

replaced Horry in Georgetown but correspondence between
Marion and Horry indicates that it was in July 1782 .
Col . Lushington made his claim of trade using Guineas,
6,000 . The value of the Guinea was about $5.00, therefore
$30,000.
202 General Isaac Huger to Francis Marion, January 28,
1781, James, op. cit., App. A, Marion to Greene, June 16,
1781, Greene Papers , Clements Library, Greene to Marion,
December 13, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 221-222,
and Simms, op . cit., p. 192-.- - -
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That section of the district was particularly friendly
to the British while they controlled Georgetown.

Salt

was equal in importance to any other item of supply.
They used it to preserve meats and salt was a necessary
part of a man 's diet in such a hot and humid climate . 2 03
Greene considered the need for salt to be so important
that he informed the President of the Continental Congress,
Samuel Huntingdon, when in May of 1781, Marion and Henry Lee
cut the enemy's supply of salt, of which Greene's own
supply was almost totally unprovided. 204

When the British

evacuated Georgetown, Marion considered his most important
acquisition to be the salt left by the British.

He

attached the same significance to his search for salt as
he did in the leveling of the British defensive works. 205
Salt was perhaps Mar ion' s major logistica l contribution to the supply effort .

Correspondence to and from

Marion indicates that h e was the primary disburser of salt
in Sou t h Carolina .

As previously stated, salt was produced

along the Waccamaw River in .Marion's district.

The men who

produced the salt did not want to serve in the American

2 0 3 Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, January 1,
1781, Greene Papers , Clements Library.
204Nathanae l Green e to Samuel Huntingdon, May 14,
1781, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 70-72.
205 Franci~ Marion to Nathanael Greene, June 5,
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library.
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militia.

The need for their supply of salt was so g reat

however that Governor Rutledg e authorized Marion to grant
exemptions from militia duty in return for their production
of salt . 206
Greene . 207

Marion provide d salt to Rutledge, Sumter and
Greene had only a small supply of salt due to

the poor overland transportation from the North.

He

therefore looked to Ge neral Marion for his supply.208
Marion's source of supp ly of salt was not limited to his
own district.

He receive d an enormo us amount of salt in

trade throu g h Georgetown.

One sing le shipment in

February 1782 amounted to fifteen hundre d bushe l s from
Bermuda . 209

The main function of the d e pot built by

Marion at Black Ming o in hlarch 1782 was the storage of
salt. 210
Marion and hi s me n also spent a considerable amount
of time and effort in denying the British rice.

They

206

John Rutledge to Francis Marion, October 16,
1781, Gibbe s, op. cit., Vol . III, pp . 190-192.
207 John Rutledge to Francis Marion, October 16,
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 192-193 and
Rutledge to Thomas Sumter, November 8, 1781, Draper Mss,
7VV514-515.
208 Nathanael Gree n~ to Francis Marion, October 16,
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, p . 194 .
209 noughty and Bryan [Merchants] to Francis Marion,
February 17, 1782, Gibbe s, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 253-254.
2 .1 ~Francis Marion to Peter Horry, March 13, 17 82,
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol . III, pp. 271-272.
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endeavored to move all the rice which was near or easily
accessible to the British .
water .

They normally moved it by

Since the tonnage and quantity involved was so

much greater than that of salt, the manpower requirement
was enormous.

To move the rice Marion had to employ

every available boat and Negro in the area. 2 1 1

Although

the rice was located in Marion's district, he did not
exercise the same autocratic control over it as he did
with salt.

Marion protected the rice but control of this

commodity in Marion's district was exercised by Colonel
Grimk~ .

Marion had to request his own supply of rice

from Grimk~ just l ike everyone else.

Grimk~ was one of

the confiscation commission e rs and as such was tasked
with the responsibility of disbursing the property of
the confiscated estates. 212
Marion was also required to provide men for the
movement and rounding up of cattle in the district .

It

r equ ired less manpower but the necessity of denial was
of major importance .

Marion used his initiative in

211 Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene , January 9 ,
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library .
212 Francis Marion to Peter Horry, March 29, 1782,
Greene Papers, Clements Library, Marion to Colonel Grimk~,
April 9 , 1782, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III, and Angelina
/
-Grimke Weld to Lyman C. Draper, April 24, 1874, Draper Mss,
1 5VV162-163. This Colonel Grimke was probably the father
of the famous abolitionist Grimke sisters . Angelina
states that her father was a Colonel in the American
forces . He was educated well enough to have acted in the
. job of confiscation commissioner having rece i ved a degree
from Oxford before the war began.
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moving all the cattle he could find away from the British.
He sought to move the cattle located near Charleston to
the north s~de of the Santee River where he could better
control and protect them . 213

Greene was as interested

in denying the British horses as he was in preventing
foodstuffs from reaching them .

It was his contention

that if the British could not obtain horses they could
not afford to venture far out of Charleston.

This would

be caused by their insufficient transportation capability
and they would therefore be unable to resupply themse lves.
Gre ene directed Marion to p e rsonally gather all th e horses
in his district and move them out of the reach of the
British.

This responsibility was not to be del egated to

the people be c ause Green e did not believe they wou ld
carry out the order . 21 4
The denial and harassment ope rations were very
effective throug h the first half of 1781.

At that time

Marion informe d Greene that the people of Charleston were
greatly distressed for the want of fresh provisions. 215

213 Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, June 16,
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library .
214Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, December 27,
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 226-227.
The area
where Marion was to effect this mission was the area around
Charleston. Althou gh the people probably objected, no
specific instances were found.
Marion later (see Chapter V)
received the mission to halt trade in this same area .
215 Francis Marion to Nathanael Greene, June 25,
1781, Greene Papers, Clements Library.
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The efforts of all the American forces in the South t o
reduce the chain of f or ts between Charleston and Camden
had also cu ·; the supply line and caused the Br itish to
withdraw in to the vicinity of Charleston.

With the advent

of the increased strength and improved tactical position
of the Americans in the South, the denial operations
changed slightly.

The British were forced to make forays

out of Charleston to plunder the countryside, thus
necessitating American defenses a g ainst tactics similar
to thos e they had employed only a few months earlier.
The British were also encouraging trade wi th the people
out in the country.

The British were so s uccessful in

obtaining supplies by these methods that Governor Mathews
was moved to comment in Au gus t 1782 that the Charleston
markets had a grea t qu antity of all items need ed on a
daily basis . 216

This was quite a di fferen t situation than

that which existed in June 1781 .

Althou g h the British

had been uns u ccessful militarily in the interim period ,
their log i st ical pos i tion had improved to the point of
plenty.
Gover nor Mathews assigned Marion the mission of
halting the trade between Charleston and the countryside.
Marion's plan to effect this order was simple, move all
the people d ealing with the British, confiscate their

216 John Math ews to Francis Marion , August 29,
_1782, Gibbes, op . cit., Vol . II, pp . 215-216.
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property, and prosecute them under the sedition act. 217
In actions typical of twentieth century politicians,
Governor Mathews and the Privy Council disapproved his
plan. 218

Although Marion's efforts were limited by

Governor Mathews and the Council, the denial of trade
probably contributed to the British evacuation of
Charleston a month and a half later on December 14, 1782.
The military requirements pl aced on Francis Marion
did not in any way cause the logistical demands placed
on him to b e lig htened.

These d emands came from General

Greene , Governor Rutledge , and after him, Governor Mathews .
In addition to limited military operations, trade regulation,
defensive operations and log istical denial efforts, he
received requisitions for suppli es .

With all these

respon s ibilities it is no t hard to understand that
Marion's military operations were curtailed.

217 Franc is Marion to John Mathews, September 24,
1782, Gibbes , op. ci t ., Vol. II, pp. 231-232.
218 John Mathews to Francis Marion , Oc tober 6 and 15,
1782, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 232-234. These
politicians gave-th e military commanders a mission and
then ti ed their hands by failin g to give them the authority
necessary to accomplish the assigned mission.

CHAPTER V
MARION AND POLITICS
General Marion answered to the politicians of the
state whose demands increased his duties.

During Marion's

tenure as a militia brigadier in Eastern South Carolina
he served under two governors, John Rutledge (1776-1778
and 1779-1782) and John Mathews (1782-1783).

Governor

Rutledge's powers as governor were expanded by the Privy
Council in Fe bruary 1780 during the British siege of
Charleston.

The members of the council, fearful for

their families and prope rty and anxious to adjourn,
authorized Rutledge to take any actions he deemed
necessary in governing the state.

He was, however, to

consult the Privy Council if convenient . 219

Five of

the members of the council remained in Charleston and
were taken as prisone rs by the British .

The governor

and the remaining three members fled to remote parts
of the state.

Thus Governor Rutledge had de facto

dictatorial powers . 220

This proved to be an excellent

219 Macmillan, op. cit., pp. 75-75 and Appendix B,
p. 286.
The council madeone exception to Rutledge 's
powers.
He could not order the takin g of a life of a
citizen without a public trial .
220 Moultrie, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 105-106.
General Lincoln urgedthe g overnor and council (eight
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and ·necessary decision.

Rutledge acted boldly and

positively when the public spirit lagged.

He did not

however retain his autocratic powers any longer than
necessary and as soon as possible he initiated elections
and convened another General Assembly.2 2 1
Governor Rutledge, though possessed with dictatorial
powers, consulted military commanders regarding military
affairs.

He was careful to consult with the brig adiers

and General Greene in matters of a military nature. 222
He evidently tru sted their integrity and abilities .

The

governor sent blank officer commissions to the militia
commanders and did not personally approve each appointment,
though the granting of commissions would have been a
valuable political tooi. 223

He kept the commanders

informed of his actions that would affect military

members) to leave Charleston saying their services would
be more valuable in the state than as prisoners. Governor
Rutledge did not want to leave and said the people would
think he let them down . The final decision was that the
governor and three membe rs (Charles Pinckney, John Lewis
Gervais and Daniel Huger) would leave Charleston. The
remaining five members (which included Christopher Gadsden)
would remain in Charleston. They were subsequently sent
to St. Augustine and later (1781) released.
221 McGrady, op. cit ., pp. 319, 432 and 528 and
MacMillan, op. cit.-,-pp~5, 76 and 231-233.
The General
Assembly wasconve ned at Jacksonborough, South Carolina
on January 8, 1782.
222 J ohn Rutledg ~ to Francis Marion, September 15,
1781, Gibbes, op. cit ., Vol. III, pp. 162-163.
223 John Rutledg e to Francis Marion, March 8 and
September 17, 1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 32-33
and 163-166.
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operations to prevent del ay and confus ion . 224

He also

consulted with them regarding civil affairs that he thought
would have a fut ure bearing on the military situation. 22 5
Although Governor Rutl edge delegated considerable authority,
he still maintained control of the situation and was
respected by a11.226
Rutl e dge used the brigadiers considerably in the
civil operation of the state, thereby placing additional

burdens on them but at the same time increas in g their
influence in their districts .

In his desire to return

the state to civil law as early as possible he directed
the brigadiers to recommend men for the position of
Ordinary in the civil districts of their area of responsibility.227

Within Marion's area he was to appoint men to

224As examples he informed them b efore hand of his
intentions of granting pardons to Loya lis ts to come over
to the American side (to be covered later) and of his
issuance of passes to individuals, thus facilitating the
passage of those persons and validating the passes.
The problems of verifying t h e validity of passes was
time consuming for the brigadiers who had to be especially
watchful of illega l passage by British sympathizers.
225 John Rutledge to Francis Marion , September 15,
1781, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, pp . 162-163.
226 Francis Marion to John Palmer , Jr., August[?],
1781 , Charlestown Yearbook of 1898, App. A, and John
Rutledge to Marion, September 26 and October 5, 1781,
Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 173-175 and 178-180.
227 The duti es of the Ordinaries included proving
wills, letters of testimen tary and generally run the
civil government.
In civil law the Ordinary was a judge
with authorit y to act upon cases in his own right and
not by delegation.
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to the post of Ordinary in the civil districts of Cheraw,
Charleston and Georgetown. 228

Rutledge wanted Marion to

appoint men who would be located n ear him (Marion) for
their own safety. 229

The brigadiers were also told to

appoint J ustices of the Peace in every civil district.230
The "Swamp Fox" took measures to protect the appointed
civil servants by giving the Justic es of the Peace the
authority to call out the militia of their distr ict to
prevent the carrying off of property or to dis ciplin e
people interfering with the civil adm ini stration. 2 3 1
Governor Rutl edge was also interested in winnin g
over the Loyalists in the state to the American side
through the i ssuanc e of pardons .

Although this was a

civil matter h e assigned the task of approving p ardons
to the brigad iers , thereby adding to their responsibilities.
The Gove rnor initiate d his pardon plan in September 1781 .
He conside r e d the time ripe to iss u e the pardon proclamation

228 John Rutledge to Franci s Marion , August 13,
1781, Gibbes , op . cit., Vol. III, pp. 126-127.
229 John Rutledge to Francis Mar ion, September 14,
1781, Gibb es, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 159-160.
230 John Rutledge to Francis Mar ion, September 2,
and October 24, 1781, Gibbes , op . cit., Vol. III, pp. 131
and 196-198. The Oxford Dic t ionary defined the Justice of
Peace a s an inferior magistrate (civil officer charged
with administrati on of laws and criminal jurisdiction)
appointed to p reserve the peace in a county , town, or
district.
231 Francis Marion to John Palmer, Jr., Esquire ,
Charleston District, August[?] , 1781 , Charleston Yearbook
of 1898 , p . 381.
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but ·he fir ~t asked the brigadiers, Sumter, Pickens, and
Marion, their advice on the matter.

The Governor's

greatest apprehension was the effect the proclamation
would have on the people who had been loyal patriots
from the start. 232
Pardons were to be given to all people who had
borne arms with the enemy and were still with them with
the following exceptions:

(1) Those who refused to answer

Rutledge's two previous proclamation s ;

(2) Individuals

who had earlier refused to t ake an oath of allegiance
to America;

(3) Those who signed congratulatory messages

to Cornwallis and Clinton;
commission s;

(4) Men who he ld British

(5) Individuals whose conduct was so infamous

that they could ne ver be pardoned.

All persons seeking

pardons were to surrender themselves to a brigadier of
militia of the state within thirty days.

If their pardon

was approved by the brigad ier they were required to perform
militia du t y for six consecutive months and subsequently
to perform duty as all other militiame n, two months duty
and four months at home .

The family of the pardoned man

was allowed to r e turn and reoccupy the prope rty without
interruption.

Individuals whose pardons were refused

were assured a safe return into the British lines .

This

too was the responsibility of the brigadie rs . 233

232 John Rutledge to Francis Marion, September 15,
1781, Gibbes , op. cit . , Vol. III, pp . 162-163.
233 Proc lamation-State of South Carolina, By his
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In November 1781 Governor Rutledge was prepared to
return the state to the control of the General Assembly
and directed the brigad i ers to appoint district poll
managers to conduct elections for a General Assembly.
Although the position of brigadier would become more
influential through this action it also added to their
already great burdens.

Marion's district was to send

ten Senate members to the assembly. 23 4

The method of,

and individuals responsible for, conducting the elections
lends credence to later accusations that the General
Assembly resembled a military tribunal.

That accusation

is further substantiated in the correspondence of General
Greene to the various brigadiers.

General Greene not only

encouraged hlarion to run for the Senate, but he also tried
to get Thomas Sumter to run for election.

Greene argued

there was no time like the present to get the people to
raise state troops .

This was a time, he said, when civil

gratitude was warm .

With the threat of emin ent danger

there would be little difficulty in getting business

Excellency John Rutledge, Esquire, Governor and Commanderin-Chief of the said State, Gibbes, op. cit. , Vol. III,
pp. 175-178. Marion was required tokeep an account of
the pardons grante d and disapproved but the listing and
accounting are unavailabl e .
234John Rutledge to Francis Marion, November 23,
1781, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol . III, pp. 214-215 .
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approved which would be favorable militarily . 235

Greene

also apologized for detaching Colonel Wade Hampton to
Georgia during the elections.

He asked Sumter to replace

Hampton who was desirous of getting into the assembly. 2 3 6
General John Barnwell of the Beaufort District wrote
Marion that he was u s ing his influence to get "good"
men elected to the assembly. 237
General Marion was one of those elec t ed as a
Senator to the General Ass embly which met b etween
January 8 and February 26, 1782 at Jacksonboroug h, thirty
five miles west of Charleston. 238

The first order of

business for this new assembly was the elect ion of a
governor .

Rutledge was ineligible and Christophe r Gadsden,

only recently releas e d from British imprisonment in
St. Augustine , Florida, was elected.

Gadsden declined

235Nathan ae l Greene to Thomas Sumter, December 12,
1781, Draper Mss , 7VV543 - 545; Biog raphical •Directory of
the American Cong ress, 1774-1961 (Washington: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1676; and Robe rt
Bass, Gamecock: The Life and Campa i gns of Gen eral Thomas
Sumter (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961),
pp. 213-219.
Thomas Sumter did not actively seek election
but was elected as a Senator anyway.
He attended the
General Assembly and after i t was adjourned he resigned
his position as brigadier.
236 Nathanae l Greene to Thomas Sumter, December 12,
1781, Draper Mss, 7VV543-545.
237 General John Barnwell to Francis Marion, December 12,
1781, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III , pp . 220-221.
The term
"good" here means inen of a pro-mi li tary American inclination .
238Draper Mss , 16VV112 (Copy of a list of the
Jacksonborough Assembly, 1782; Lyman C. Draper found the
original in the Rutledge Manuscripts).
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the appointment on the basis of age and poor health .
The assembly then chose John Mathews who had b een a
membe r of the Continental Congress where he had b een
influential in Nathanael Greene's replacement of Gates
as commander of the Southern Army .

239

Mathews had b een

a member of the Committee at Headquarters with the mission
of improving Congressional support of the army. 240

As a

result of his efforts to secure log istical support for the
army he interceded b etween Washing ton and Greene and the
Continental Con g ress.

I t was at this time that he earned

the respect of Ge n eral Washington and c ul t ivated his
(Mathews) respect for Major General Greene , at that tim e
the Quartermaster General of the Continental Army .

This

mutual re spect facilitated John Mathews ' efforts to wr ite
General Washington direct l y as the authorized representative
of the d e l egates of the three Southern States request ing

239 Moul trie , op. cit . , Vol.

I I, pp. 320-321.

24 0Edmund C. Burnett, The Continental Con g ress
(New York: The MacMillan Co . , 1941 ), pp. 445-470 and
Journals of the Continental Cong ress, 1774-1789 (Washington:
Gover nment Printing Off ice, 1910), Vo l . XVI, (1780),
p. 362. The Committee at Headquarters was a committee
of three , Mathews , Philip Schuyler (N . Y. ) and Nathanae l
P eabody (N . H.) . The election o f the members was conducted
by the Congress on April 13, 1780.
I n the committee's
efforts to help the army they were rebuked by the
Continen tal Cong ress and disbande d in late 1780.
Failure
on the part of Congress to support Greene (through the
committee) led to his resignation as Quartermaster
General soon aft er the committee's recommendations were
reject ed for supply of the army.
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the appointment of Greene as the Southern Army Commander. 241
Washington honored Mathews' request and recommended Greene's
appointment to Congress which was approved and carried into
effect officially on October 31, 1780 with Greene arriving
in the South in December 178o . 2 4 2
Governor Mathews was an excellent politician.

A

b iographer of General Horatio Gates stated that Mathews
was "politically wise seven days a week. 11243

His election

was probably a fortuna te choice for the state.
were some who feared the gove rnment would fail.

There
George

Washington Greene , grandson of Nathanael Greene , believed
that a collision between military and civil authoriti es
during 1782 was inevitable .

There might have b een a

disastrous split had it not b een for the mutual respect
and friendship between Mathews and Gr eene . 244

The Ge neral

241 John Mathews to Geor ge Washin gton, October 6,
1780 , Letters of the Members of the Continental Cong ress,
Edmund C. Burnett (ed.) (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1931), Vol. V, p. 408.
242 George Washington to Nathanael Greene , October 14,
1 780 and Washington to John Mathews, October 23, 1780,
The Writings of Geor e Washington 1745-1799, John C.
Fitzpatrick e d.
(Washing ton: Gov ernment Printing Office,
1937, Vol . 20, pp . 181- 183 and 248-249.
243 samuel White Patterson, Horatio Gates, Defender of
American Libe rties (New York: Columbia University Press ,
1941), p . 317 .
He did no t however exhibit extraordinary
political acuity in his dealin gs with Congress as a member
of the Committee at Headqu arters in mid-1780. At that time
he berated, in writing , the poor efforts of the Congress
to support the army .
244 G. W. Greene, op . cit . , Vol. III, p . 434 and
Macmillan, op. cit . , p . 135 . - -
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Assembly gave Governor Mathews the same powers it had given
Rutledge, but since the American Army controlled most of
the state it was not convenient for the Governor to confer
with the Privy Council on important items. 245
Mathews , an astute politician, required that commissions
for all officers to be appointed must receive his approval.
He refused to send blank commissions , thus causing the
commanders to wonder whether he trusted them. 246

He also

granted exemptions from militia du ty without consulting
the militia commander involve d, a switch from the policy
of Governor Rutledge . 247

On occasion Mathews issued

orders of a military nature without even informing the
commanders, upon one occasion ordering i\Iar ion to call up
all his militia.

After i\Iarion issued the order to report,

Mathews wrote him that he had previous ly exempted four
companies from duty . 248
to most military me n.

Mathews' actions did not appeal
Cap tain James Conyers, who took

over Colonel Hezekiah Mahrun's cavalry unit, considered

245Mountrie, op. cit., Vol . II, p . 321 and John
Rutledge to Francis Mar ion, October 15, 1782, Gibbes,
op . cit., Vol. II, p. 234.
The Privy Council reversed
Mathews' decision on at least one occasion when i\Iarion
had requested authority to prosecute individuals trading
with the British .
24 6 John Ma thews to Francis Marion, April 10, 1782,
Gibbes, op . cit . , Vol. II, pp. 157-158.
247 John Mathews to Francis Marion , April 15, 1782,
Gibbes , op. cit . , Vol. II, pp. 164-165.
248 John Mathews to Francis Marion, May 27, 1782,
Gibbes , op . cit . , Vol . II, p . 182 .
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Governor Mathews to be a poor governor declaring that h e
possessed no strategy or policy whatever and had no resources
unless he h ad money, .. . "in short , he [ Ma thews]

is poor. 11 249

Thou gh Governor Rutledge had declared in September
1781 that the offer of pardon wou ld never be renewe d, i n
March 1782 Governor Mathews outlined the procedures for
granting n ew pardons.

Br i gadiers would not rul e on al l

pardons, a s they had under Rutle dge , just part of them .
The Governor wou ld de t erm i ne cases i nvolving those who
came from within the enemy l ines s ince January 8, 1782
when the Gen eral Assembly was convened .

The brigadiers

were to make d eterminations about th ose individuals who
were app lyin g for the f irst time but those who were
applyin g for a second time were to b e referred to the
Governor .

Those indi v idua l s applyi n g for pardons and

refus e d were t o b e retu rned safely i nto the Britis h
lines but i f they were ever found in the American lines
a gai n they were to b e punished as sp i es . 2 5 0
The protection afforded the General Assembly to
secure i ts meet ing place at Jacksonb orough was prov ide d
by Marion's brigade . 2 51

Marion however was at t ending

249 c apta i n J ames Conyers to Francis Mar ion, Octobe r 9,
1782, Gibb es , op . c i t ., Vol. II, pp . 233-234 .
250 John Mathews to Francis Marion, March 8, 1782,
Gibbes, op . cit.; Vol. III, p . 276 .
251 Na t hanael Greene to Fran c i s Mar i on , J anuary 3,
1782, Southern History Association , Vol. XI, p. 201 .
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the Assembly and left command in the hands of Colon el
Peter Horry. 252

Colone l Hezekiah Maham disputed the

appointment of Horry by Marion.

Horry accused Maham of

interfering with his efforts to command and indicated
to Marion that the situation was serious because men were
leaving and Maham's attitude had caused a split in the
brigade .

Horry begge d Marion to reassume command because

the British would try to exploit the strife in the ranks.253
Marion was deeply concerned for the welfare of the
brigade , but h e was also mindful that his presence was
require d at the Assembly.

Although h e had asked permission

to leave the Assembly, which was disapproved, h e was also
interested in several bills presently on the floor which
were of dire necessity to the military.

He wrote Horry

that only thirteen senators were present, and since a
large part of them were militar y his d eparture might
cause many of them to l eave thereby ending the session . 254

252 Francis Marion to Peter Horry, January 10,
1782, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol. III, pp. 228-229 (see
pages 20-22 and54-57).
253 Peter Horry to Francis Marion, January 31,
1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 246-247.
254Francis Marion to Peter Horry, February 3 and 10,
1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 248-249; Simms,
op. cit., p. 295 ; and Bass, op. cit . , p. 217. Some of the
Senators from the military were Sumter, Hugh Horry, Colonel
Thomas Taylor and Colonel William Thompson and an even
larger number in the House.
The bills referred to included
a n ew militia law, the raising of a Continental quota, and
the Confiscation Act which would provide the necessary
money for the military elements t o be successfu l.
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Before the assemb l y could adjourn the Brit i sh (with a force
of two hundred cavalry, five hundred infantry and two
a rt illery pieces) u nder Colonel Benjamin Thompson attacked
Marion's brigade and dispersed them . 2 55

The British

comma nder claimed that Marion 's brigade lost two or t hree
hundred men wh ile the Americans estimated thei r loss at
but sixteen.

Both estimates are hard to believe . 256

In

any event , th e loss was a s i gn ificant blow to American
morale but it did n ot cause the assembly to close nor
was it of consequence to the overall outcome of the war
in the South .
The Genera l Assembly eventuall y passed the military
acts that hlarion h ad considered essential , one which was
destined to create special problems for the brigadiers .
By means of th e "Act fo r dispos ing of certain Estates and
b anishing certain p ersons there in mentioned," commonly
kn own as the Confiscation Act and has been so named, the

2 55 G. W. Greene, op. cit., Vol . III, pp. 439-441
and Thayer, op . cit. , pp-.-403-404 .
The size of the
American force could not be ascertained, perhaps due to
the differenc es between Horry and Maham . Colonel Thompson
was to later become Count Rumford of Bavaria as a result
o f his eminent c i vil service to England .
2 56 Maryland Gazette, May 9, 1782, Extract of letter
from an officer in South Carol i na dated March 13, 1782.
The Amer i can estimate appears in error , otherwise there
wou ld not have been any justification for the subsequent
consolidation of the corps under Maham and Horry.
If
the British estimate had been correct Marion ' s brigade
would have been almost decimated and combat ineffect ive.
This was not the case . The two estimates clearly reflect
reporting dis crepancies .
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responsi bility for executing the act fell to five commissioners e l ected by the General Assembly.

Needless to

say, however, enforcement duties were assigned to t h e
brigadiers of the distr i cts invo l ved .

They were to protect

the commissioners and the estates confiscated and to assist
them, upon request, in confiscation.

This necessarily

posed increased problems for the military commanders.
In an effort to fac ilitate confiscation the Assembly
appended the nam~s of two hundred thirty six indiv idu a ls
whose property was to be conf i scated by the commiss i oners .
Th e people whose estates we r e to b e taken would be banished
from the state forever and were granted forty-five days
to leave .

If they remained longer they were to be j ai l ed

and, if c onv i cted b y tri al, executed. 257

Althoug h Marion

had opposed the Confisc ation Act at t h e Assembly as being
"unwise and impolitic," it being his idea that the war
was almost over and now was a time to be forgiving, this
did not d eter him in executing the law.258

Marion expen d ed

a considerable amount of time and effort in carrying out
Mathews' directive enforcing the confiscation.

He received

257 south Carolina Session Laws , January 8 to
February 26, 1782, "An Act for disposing of c e rtain Estates
and b an ishi ng certain persons therein mentioned"
(Philadelphia : 1782).
2S8B. s. Pe rry , Gre e n e ville, South Carolina,
Ente rprise and Mountaineer, September 11, 1878, in
Draper Mss, 2UU229; and John Mathews to Francis Marion ,
March 1, 1782 , Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 259.
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requests from individual s asking that they b e d eleted from
the confiscation list. 259

But his most time consuming

problem was in sending men, women a nd children back to
the British lines. 260
Marion's desire to end bl oodshed was sincere for
he initiated act ion toward that end in his own district
in June 1781.

At

that time he tried to e nt er into treat i es

wi t h Major Mic ajah Ganey, the Loyalist leader of his
district.

I n these efforts a nd subsequent s u ccess Mar ion

exhibi ted perhaps hi s greates t skil l s as a politic i an ,
diplom at and soldier .

General Nathanael Greene complimented

Mar i o n declaring that the abi li ty to get something of t h e
mag nitude of the treaty with Ganey wi thout bloo dshed
reflected more honor on an officer than could ever be
bestowed as a r esul t of the use of force. 2 6 1
Mica jah Ganey was a house hold word for the peop l e
living in Marion's district, for Ganey's Loyalists h ad
b een operating in Eastern Sou t h Carol ina even before
Marion assumed command of his b rigade.

The Loyalist

band controlled the country from the Pedee north to the

259 Robert Blair to Francis Marion , September 7,
1782, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . II, pp. 224- 225 .
2 60Francis Marion to Peter Horry, ·March 8, 10, 12,
a n d 20, 1782 , Gibbes, op . cit ., Vo l. III, pp. 266- 268,
270 and 277-278 and John Mat h ews to Horry, June 2 , 1782,
Gibbes , op. cit . , Vo l . II , p. 183.
261Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion , July 9,
1782, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol . II, pp . 1 97-198 .
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North Carolina line and from Cheraw eastward to the
Waccamaw.

They normally numbered about five hundred men.

Their supply of arms and ammunition was initially obtained
from the British at Georgetown.

The evacuat ion of

Georgetown by the British dealt them a severe blow but
they continued to operate with tactics learned from Marion
and his men. 262

Gan ey's success in harassing Marion's

forces in the district is evident in Marion's correspondence
and through his concern for the safety of Georgetown and
Black Mingo, the storage depot .

Loyalists successfully

tied down forces in the area and thereby prevented an
acc eptabl e turnout of the militia . 263
It is evident that Marion, in addition to his desire
to prevent bloodshed, was also interested in halting the
military threat posed by the Loyalists on the Pedee .

He

succeeded in signing his first agreement with Ganey on
June 17, 1781 whic h called for a cessation of hostilit i es
for at l east three but not more than twelve months .

Both

2 6 2 colonel Robert Grey, "Observations of the War
in Carolina," North Carolina University Magazine, Vol. I I I,
(Nov. 1888 ), Draper Mss , 17VV42-4215.
263 colone l Lamb Benton to John Mathews, August 20,
1782, and Benton to Francis Marion, August 29, 1782,
Gibbes, op. cit. , Vol . II, pp . 207-209 and 214-215 . When
Marion initial ly took Georgetown he had no idea the town
would be used log i stically and he employed the previous l y
us e d procedure of destroying the enemy's defense . This
l ater caused him to have to erect his own defensive works.
The turnout of militia was never 100 percent but in th is
case the Cheraw area did not come close to that figure
thinking it necessary to retain men for their own l ocal
defense.
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sides were to have free in tercourse of traffic u nmo les t ed.
In the event that a p erson was bothere d or hi s property
taken or destroye d, the affected person cou ld file a
complai nt.

The complaint was to be heard by a court

martial of f i ve men; t wo Loyalists, two Americans and an
officer commanding the unit of which the complainant was
\

a member.

Plunder was to be restore d.

The wording of

the a g r eeme n t was more of an un d ers tanding t han a treaty
and refl ected that neither party was stron g enou gh to
d efeat the other. 2 64
The a greement of June 1781 l asted for only the
minimal term of three months . 26 5

Not until Jun e of 1782

was an y positive a ction taken by Marion .

At that time

North Carolina's Governor, Alexand e r Marti n, wrote Mar ion
that h e had ordered 250 men to move toward South Carolin a
to assist i n the effort to put a stop to Ganey and his
men who were harborin g n otor ious North Carolinians.
News of the a ct ions of the Governor of North Carolina
d id no t arrive until after the treaty was signed. 266

264 Arti c l es of Agreement made and concluded between
Colonel Pet er Horry, in behalf of General Marion, and
Major Gan ey , Commanding officer of the Loyalists or
King's s ubj ects , i nhabitants l ying between Gr eat Pee
Dee [sic] Ri ver and North Caro lina.
Gibbes , ~ · cit.,
Vol. III, p. 98 .
265 Major John J ames to Francis Mar i on , September 20,
1781, Gibbes , op. cit., Vol . III, pp . 170-171.
266 Extract of l etter, Governor Thomas Burke
. (predecessor to Alexander Mar tin as governor of North
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Marion had received guidance from his Governor,
John Mathews, concerning the truce negotiations and he
(Marion) sent Colonel Peter Horry, Colon e l Baxter and
Major John James to confer with Ganey on terms for a new
treaty. 267

Their efforts were successful and Marion and

Ganey signed the treaty on June 8, 1782 .

An effective

i tem in nego tiating the treaty was a letter by General
Leslie (British) to General Nathanael Gre e ne.

The letter

containe d Sir Hepry Clinton's comments concerning the
possibility of a suspension of hostilities in the North
and his hopes for the same in th e Sou t h .
this pos e d a morale problem . 268

For Loyalists

Ganey ' s men were to lay

down their arms and not to resume hostilities un til cal led
in support of South Carolina a ga in st t h e British.

They

were required to return all property taken from any
Ameri cans .

Any of the Loya lists who refus ed the t erms

of the t reaty were to b e turned over to the Americans
who would exchange them for American prisoners. 269

Carolina) to John Rutl e dge , March 6, 1782, (initial complaint of North Carolina a g ainst Ganey) and Peter Horry to
Francis Marion , January 31, 1782, Gibbes , op . cit . , Vol. II I ,
pp . 246-247 and 265-266; and Governor Alexander Martin to
Francis 1larion, Jun e 8, 1782, Gibbes, op. cit., Vol. II,
pp . 185-186 .
- .

267 John Mathews to Francis Marion, May 21, 1782
and Marion to Major Gan ey , June 2, 1782, Gibbes, op . cit . ,
Vol. II, pp. 183-186.
268 General Alexander Leslie to Nathanae l Gre ene ,
May 23, 1782, Gibbes, op. cit . , Vol . II , p. 179 .
269 Tr~aty b etween General Franci s Marion in b ehalf
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Governor Mathews extended to General Marion the
thanks and ~oncurren ce of all members of the Privy Counci l
on the treaty.

The Governor believed the results of such

a treaty without bloodshed wou l d b e even greater when
fin al peace was realizect. 270

There still remained however

the matter of rounding up and ha ndling the Loyalists who
refu sed t h e treaty terms . 271

The maj ority of Ganey's men

(the largest est imate of Ganey's force has been placed at
about five hundred) joined Marion's brigade .

They fought

on Marion ' s side in his last eng a gement against the British
und er Colonel Frazier in the l atter part of Aug u st 1782.
They proved to b e some of the b est fi ghters in the bri gade .
They sure ly unde rstood that i f they were taken b y the
Brit ish their penalty would be d e ath . 272

of the State of South Carolina , and Major Micaj ah Ganey
and the inhabitants under his command wh ich were included
in the treaty made the 17th of June , 1781 with Major Ganey,
Gibb es , op . cit ., Vol. III, p. 98.
270 John Mathews t o Francis Marion, June 1 5 , 1782,
Gib bes , op. cit ., Vo l. II , pp . 190-191.
271 Francis Mar i on t o Peter Horry , June 9, 1782,
Gibbes , op. cit ., Vol . II, pp . 187-188. One body numbering
at l eastthirty men und er Colone l Fannin g were i n this
category .
272Thayer , o~ . ~-i t . , pp. 403-404 and Simms, EE· c it . ,
p. 320.
It i s very doubtful that the number who fought with
Marion ever totaled 500 men but there is no definite or
estimate d number .

~ ONCLUSION
Contrary to popular belief, Francis Marion was not
the dominant military figure in South Carolina durin g the
Revolutionary War .

He placed a distant second to Major

General Nathanael Greene in both accomplishments and the
eyes of contemporary South Carolinians.

The decision of

the people was evidenced by the General Assembly of
South Carolina on February 26, 1782.

At that time the

Assembly passe d a bill entitled, "An Act to empower
Thomas Ferguson, Morton Wilkinson , and John Ward, Esquires,
to purchase an Estate of the value of Ten Thousand Guineas
[about $50,000] in Trust, and for the use of the Honorable
Major General Nathanael Greene . "

At the same time the

Assembly voted to a ward Marion a go ld medal for his
services .
Marion's biographers wou ld hav e the reader believe
that he was a magnetic and natural leader .

This was not

always the case (i . e. Colonel Hezek iah Maham), th ough he
(Marion) was evidently an excellent l eader .

He also

needed authority and had to use it to maintain discipline.
General Hamilton H. Howze, commander of United Nations
forces in Korea 1962 through 1964, said that the man who
claims that he can, simply by exercising his magnetic
person al ity, persuade another man to attempt something
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very like ly to kill him is a "monumental idiot. 11273

Marion

needed the authority given by the South Carolina General
Ass embly and the directives of the Governors to make his
forces r eport for duty and do their du ty once they reported .
Marion was also known to place men in j ail who had violated
l aws .
It appears that Marion ' s initial reasons for
assumption of command have b een g lamorized to the point
of discredit of Gen e r al Horatio Gates.

General Gates

h ad been accus e d of sendin g l\Iarion to command the
Williamsbur g mi li tia b ecause the bizarre appearanc e of
Marion and his men was distractin g to the regular soldiers
under Gates .

Why he sent Marion away and attached a

portion of hi s own force (about four hundred men) to
General Thomas Sumter has never been answered .

Gates ,

whose greatest shortcoming was impatience, fai l ed to
r ecord his innermost thou g hts or strategy .

That omission

l eft him ope n to future assumptions and presumptions.
Francis l\Iarion's actions after tak ing over the Williamsburg
militia indicate that he receive d a similar miss ion from
Ga tes as h e did later from Gree ne .
Marion was to obtain intelligenc e , harass the enemy
and cut their supp l y lines .

I t was as a guerri lla leader

that Marion's fame was primarily extolled.

Ironicall y , he

273 Hamilton H. Howze, "Military Discipline and
National Security," Army Magazine, Vol. 21, No . 1
(January, 1 971), p . 1 4.
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only served as a true gu errill a leader for nine and one
half months , August 10, 1780 through May 28, 1780 when
he took ove:· Georgetown.

Even when h e participated in

significant major battles, such as Eutaw Spr ings, Marion's
forc e served as reinforcements to the nucleus of Generals
Gre e n e and Sumter.

His force size f l uctuated too much to

be coun te d on as a major force i n d ecisiv e e n gagements .
Nathanael Greene was quick to point out the ins i gnificance
of a force like Marion's .

He said that the small parties

o f guerri ll as were h e lpful but of no consequence in the
great eve n ts of the war .
However , it was outside the purely mil i tary realm
where Mar i on made his most significant contr ibutions .
His continued presence i n Eastern South Carolina maintained
the morale of the Americans in that area.

Marion's s u ccess

in establishing a truce with the Loyalists in his district
exhibited hi s diplomacy and desire to terminate hosti lities .
Bu t Marion ' s g reatest contribution to the Sou thern Campaign
in the Revolutionary War was throu g h l ogistics .

He was the

primary s upplier of sal t for the Sou thern Army and maintained
a supply depot for that necess ary commodity at Black Mingo .
Fur ther, his control of Georgetown and its port facility
provided Ge neral Greene with a more extensive logistical
base than h e had ever before experi enced in the Southern
Theater .

Th e rivers radia t ing out of Georgetown into the
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in terior portions of South Carolina also provided Greene
with an increased li ne of communication and control.
After the war Marion moved to his plantation in
S t. John's to rebuild his estate .

He married a wealthy

spinster , Mary Esther Vid eau in 1786 .
first and only marriage .
uni on .

This was Marion's

There were no childre n by this

In 1784 Marion was g iven command of Fort John son

in Charleston Harbor with a salary of 500 pounds per year.
Upon his marriage that salary was reduced to five shillings
per day .
17 90 .

The p ost and his position were di scont inu ed in

Francis Marion lived out his days on his plantation

and died th ere on February 27, 1795.

He was buried at

Be lle Isle, South Carolina.
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Francis Marion, alias the "Swamp Fox," has been
eulogized to the point of fantasy.

He has been elevated

to a pedestal by writers rang ing from the itinerant
preacher , Mason -Locke Weems, to the c~rtoonist, Walt
Disney.

The praise and acclaim accorded Marion was

based primarily on his accomplishments as a guerrilla
leader in Eastern South Carolina during the Revolutionary
War.

Ironically, h e only served as a g u err illa for ten

months, Augu st 10, 1780 to May 28, 1781.
Prior to this time he had served in conventional
roles in the Continental servi ce, beginning in June 1775
as a Captain in the Second South Carolina Regiment.

He

later commanded that regiment (September 1776 to April 1780)
as a Lieutenant Colonel.

It was not until August 1780

that he first employed guerril la tactics, many of which
he had observed first hand in the Indian Wars of 1759 and

1761.

Although he was successful in his utilization of

such tactics against the Brit ish, he was thrus t back into
a more conventional ro l e when he occupie d Georgetown,
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South Carolina in May 1781.

With the acquisition of

Georgetown, his whereabouts were no longer clothed in
the secrecy of the guerrilla, reacting openly to all
att empts or threats of such against Georgetown.
It was control of Georgetown that led to one of his
two major roles in the Revolutionary War.

As the militia

commander in charge of the district of which Georgetown
was a part, he b ec ame deeply involved in the trade in
that port city.

He established prices, controlled trade

and became the principal supplier of salt, a vital
necess ity in the South Carolina climate , for the Southern
Theater.

The importance of the port facility nec e ssitated

Marion's change to a defensive posture .

Thus he became

a vital part of the log istical operations in the South .
His second major contribution in this theater durin g
the critical years , 1780-1782, was his ability to maintain
the morale of the Americans of Eastern South Carolina
Most of his military efforts were directed toward that
goal as it assured him of a militia force .

He was an

excellent leader or he would not have been able to retain
the confidence of the people.

But, contrary to the verbal

picture painted by some authors, he was a stern disciplinarian.

Marion was capable of severe ly punishing

people for v i o lations against the Amer ican cause.

Several

of the leadership problems in his brigade were actually
initiated, inadvertently of course, by General Nathanael

3

Gree·ne, such as the case of the independent corps of
Lieutenant Colonels Peter Horry and Hezekiah Maham.
Marion had other responsibilities which minimized
his ability to perform in a strictly military role.
As a militia brigadier responsible for about one-third
of the state, he performed political functions ranging
from the conduct of elections to appointment of Justices
of the Peace.

He was also charged with the overall

responsibility of l aw and order in his district and the
granting of parole pardons to former Loyalists .

Marion

was elected and attended a forty eigh~ day session of
the South Carolina General Assembly in 1782 which took
him away from military operations.

Thus the responsi-

bilities of an effective brigadier covered a broad
spectrum and left very little time for military operations.
Marion's overall importance in the Southern
Theater, thoug h considerable, must be considered in the
proper perspective.

General Nathanael Greene was the

first to reflect on the importance of an element such
as Marion's force .

Greene said that though a group such

as Marion's brigade was important, it was of no consequence
in the great events of war.

A more materialistic impression

of Marion's value , in comparison with General Greene,
the Southern Army Commander , was evidenced by the South
Carolina General ·Assembly in February 1782.

That body

voted to a ward an estate of a value of $50 ,000 ( 10,000

4

guineas) to General Greene for his services to the state.
At the same meeting that body voted Francis Marion a
gold medal for his services.
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